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Chapter	1			A	state’s	ability	to	effectively	deploy	soft	power	instruments	in	the	service	of	its	foreign	policy	objectives	is	arguably	far	more	important	in	the	21st	century	than	its	ability	to	amass	and	employ	hard	power	(Nye	2004;	Wilson	2008;	Atkinson	2010).	Many	of	the	most	pressing	issues	for	today’s	states—for	example,	seeking	solutions	to	violence	and	unrest	in	the	Middle	East	and	integrating	developing	countries	into	the	global	economy—require	that	states	try	to	shape	the	interests	of	other	actors	in	the	international	system	through	persuasion	and	attraction	rather	than	coercion	or	the	use	of	force	(Nye	2009,	Summers	2010).		The	central	importance	of	soft	power	is	now	widely	accepted	and	publicly	acknowledged	by	most	of	the	major	Western	powers.	Consider	the	U.K.	Government,	which	has	recently	released	a	strategy	document	that	attempts	to	better	align	its	foreign	aid	policy	with	its	national	interests.	It	states	that	a	central	purpose	of	its	foreign	aid	program	is	to	increase	the	“UK’s	soft	power	and	our	ability	to	project	our	influence	across	the	globe”	(HM	Treasury	and	DFID	2015:	18).		Similarly,	Australia	has	sought	to	expand	its	soft	power	to	neighboring	countries.		Julie	Bishop,	Australia’s	Foreign	Minister,	is	a	vocal	proponent	of	the	Colombo	Plan,	a	knowledge	transfer	program	that	purportedly	represents	“[Australian]	soft	power	diplomacy	at	its	best”	(Bishop	2015).				However,	the	Western	powers	are	not	alone.	The	rise	of	non-	traditional	donors—such	as	China,	South	Africa,	Saudi	Arabia,	Venezuela,	Iran,	Qatar,	UAE,	Brazil,	and	India—has	brought	greater	competition	to	the	global	marketplace	of	policy	ideas	(Schadlow	2013;	Naim	2009;	Parks	et	al.	2015).		Officials	from	these	countries	have	indicated	that	they	too	wish	to	expand	their	soft	power.		In	2014,	President	Xi	Jinping	of	China	stated	flatly,	“We	should	increase	China’s	soft	power	…	and	better	communicate	China’s	messages	to	the	world”	(Shambaugh	2015).		The	Chinese	authorities	have	followed	this	strategic	cue	and	invested	heavily	in	the	tools	of	attraction	and	persuasion	–	for	example,	scholarship	programs	that	allow	foreign	nationals	to	study	in	China,	training	programs	that	expose	foreign	government	officials	to	China’s	development	policy	ideas	and	experiences,	and	political	party	outreach	and	capacity	building	activities		(Dong	and	Chapman	2008;	Aiping	2015;	Walker	2016).	Independent	observers	note	that	China’s	own	success	in	lifting	680	million	people	out	of	poverty	in	a	generation	increases	the	credibility	and	resonance	of	its	development	policy	advice		(Ravallion	2009;	Lin	and	Wang	2014).1		
																																																								1	Jon	Huntsman,	a	former	U.S.	Ambassador	to	China,	noted	in	a	2010	cable	dispatch	to	the	State	Department	that	"China’s	fast,	efficient,	‘no	strings	attached'	bilateral	approach	is	popular	in	[Africa],	as	is	the	PRC	preference	for	infrastructure	over	governance	projects.	...	In	addition,	African	officials	believe	that	
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	Thus,	public	sector	decision-makers	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	now	have	significantly	more	choices.	They	can	select	from	a	variety	of	development	models,	including	the	Washington	Consensus,	Beijing	Consensus	and	Mumbai	Consensus	(Ramo	2004;	Gore	2000;	Williamson	2000;	Summers	2010;	Vikas	2010).			Some	scholars	and	policy	commentators	have	even	gone	so	far	as	to	argue	that	Western	and	non-	Western	donors	are	engaged	in	cutthroat	battle	for	the	hearts	and	minds	of	developing	officials,	with	the	liberal	world	order	hanging	in	the	balance	(Naim	2009;	Schadlow	2013;	Walker	2016).	Lamenting	the	West’s	supposed	inability	to	maintain	a	liberal	economic	and	political	order,	Halper	(2010)	claims	that	authoritarian	models	such	as	China’s	will	“dominate	the	21st	century.”	Moises	Naim,	the	former	editor	in	chief	of	
Foreign	Policy	magazine,	has	similarly	argued	that	“States	like	China,	Iran,	Saudi	Arabia	and	Venezuela	have	the	cash	and	the	will	to	reshape	the	world	into	a	place	very	unlike	the	one	where	we	want	to	live.	By	pushing	their	alternative	development	model,	such	states	effectively	price	responsible	aid	programs	out	of	the	market	exactly	where	they	are	needed	most.	In	place	of	those	programs,	rogue	donors	offer	to	underwrite	a	world	that	is	more	corrupt,	chaotic	and	authoritarian”	(Naim	2007b).			Yet	others	counsel	caution,	urging	policymakers	and	pundits	to	dial	back	their	bombastic	claims	and	reserve	judgment	until	there	is	a	stronger	base	of	evidence	to	support	or	discredit	such	claims.	Dreher	et	al.	(2015c)	find	that	the	motivations	that	guide	Chinese	aid	are	not	terribly	different	from	that	of	other	Western	donors.	Parks	(2015)	suggests	that	“the	Western	policy	establishment,	and	especially	U.S.	national	security	experts,	should	step	back	and	take	a	deep	breath.	The	sky	is	not	falling.”	He	presents	evidence	that	much	of	the	heated	rhetoric	related	to	the	aims	and	effects	of	Chinese	aid	is	rooted	in	speculation	rather	than	fact.							But	who	is	right?	To	date,	little	systematic	empirical	research	has	been	undertaken	to	determine	which	factors	make	a	state	influential	in	the	eyes	of	the	counterpart	country	officials	who	they	seek	to	influence.		This	weak	evidence	base	is	due,	in	large	part,	to	the	absence	of	reliable,	comparative	data	on	the	policy	influence	of	state	actors	seeking	to	project	soft	power	abroad.			The	focus	of	my	study	is	on	Western	and	non-Western	donors	who	provide	foreign	assistance	and	the	conditions	under	which	they	effectively	exert	influence	on	the	policy	priorities	of	public-sector	decision-makers	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries.	As	such,	I	cannot	and	will	not	make	broad,	generalizable	claims	about	when	soft	power	tools	are	effective	and	ineffective.	However,	my	theory	of	state	influence	is	not	necessarily	specific	to	international	development	policy	and	donor-recipient	relationships.	It	produces	a	set	of	hypotheses	that	can	and	should	be	tested	in	other	foreign	policy	settings.		
																																																																																																																																																																																		competition	between	donors	has	had	positive	consequences	for	African	development,	giving	the	African	countries	options	after	several	decades	of	a	largely	Western	development	model"	(Huntsman	2010).	
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At	the	outset,	it	is	important	to	note	that	nearly	all	empirical	research	on	aid	effectiveness	relies	on	quantifiable	measures	of	success—such	as	number	of	children	vaccinated	or	schools	built—rather	than	on	degree	to	which	donors	influence	reform	processes	and	outcomes	in	the	countries	that	they	advise	and	assist.	However,	this	narrow	definition	of	aid	effectiveness	belies	an	understanding	of	the	aims	and	activities	of	donor	agencies	in	the	21st	century	(Custer	et	al.	2015).	Whereas	aid	agencies	once	focused	their	efforts	and	energies	on	direct	service	delivery	activities,	there	is	now	a	much	stronger	emphasis	on	the	“enabling	environment”	–	that	is,	the	policies	and	institutions	that	enable	or	constrain	the	achievement	of	better	development	outcomes.			As	an	initial	point	of	departure,	it	is	important	to	take	stock	of	some	basic	empirical	patterns.			First,	some	developing	countries	are	more	interested	than	others	in	drawing	upon	external	sources	of	advice,	making	the	question	of	who	is	influenced	just	as	important	as	the	question	of	who	is	influential.		Custer	et	al.	(2015)	demonstrate	significant	variation	in	which	developing	countries	are	most	and	least	influenced	by	donors.		In	Figure	1.1,	I	draw	upon	agenda-setting	influence	data	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey	to	illustrate	the	full	scope	of	this	variation	across	low-income	and	middle-income	countries.				PARAGRAPH	ON	SURVEY	
  
10 
10 
Figure 3.1: Levels of Donor Influence on the Reform Priorities of 122 Developing Countries and Territories 
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	Custer	et	al.	(2015)	perform	an	econometric	analysis	of	the	country-level	correlates	of	
overall	donor	influence.	Among	other	findings,	they	report	that	donors	are	more	influential	in	countries	with	a	broad	coalition	of	domestic	support	for	reform.	Conversely,	they	find	that	when	the	chief	executive	of	a	counterpart	country	opposes	reform,	it	is	difficult	for	donors	to	have	much	development	policy	influence.			There	is	also	considerable	variation	in	the	levels	of	policy	influence	that	different	donors	exert	on	the	reform	priorities	and	actions	of	public	sector	decision-makers	in	the	developing	world.	Figure	1.2	draws	upon	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey	to	show	the	variation	in	agenda-setting	influence	across	donors.	Many	of	the	donors	that	development	policymakers	report	to	be	most	influential	are	Western	institutions	and	countries,	including	New	Zealand,	Ireland,	the	World	Bank,	the	European	Union,	and	Denmark.	By	contrast,	non-Western	and	non-traditional	donors	–	for	example,	the	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	(GCC)	countries,	Iran,	Russia,	Turkey,	Brazil,	and	Bulgaria	–	are	among	the	countries	and	organizations	that	registered	the	lowest	agenda-setting	influence	scores.			
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Figure 1.4: Average Agenda Setting Influence, by Donor 
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Custer	et	al.	(2015)	find	that	two	donor-level	attributes	in	particular	help	to	explain	which	donors	exert	the	most	and	least	policy	influence	in	the	developing	world.		Donors	who	align	their	reform	advice	and	assistance	with	a	country’s	priorities	are	more	likely	to	be	seen	as	influential.		This	finding	supports	the	principle	of	“country	ownership”	proposed	at	the	2005	Paris	Declaration,	which	encouraged	bilateral	and	multilateral	development	partners	to	align	their	support	with	a	country’s	national	development	strategy	(OECD	2005,	2008).			Additionally,	reliance	upon	technical	assistance	negatively	correlates	with	donor	policy	influence.	Technical	assistance	is,	in	many	ways,	the	flip	side	of	the	country	ownership	coin.	It	usually	supports	highly	paid	expatriate	advisers	rather	than	the	host	government	itself,	and	Helleiner	(2000:	84)	notes	that	technical	assistance	is	“little	more	than	a	device	for	the	monitoring	and	enforcement	of	external	conditions.”			In	this	monograph,	I	will	build	upon	this	previous	work	that	draws	upon	the	rich,	micro-level	data	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey.	Unlike	previous	studies,	I	will	attempt	to	explain	which	types	of	donors	are	most	influential	in	which	types	of	developing	countries.	I	will	develop	and	test	an	ideational	theory	of	homophily	and	focus	in	particular	on	the	governance	and	economic	policy	orientations	of	different	donors	and	developing	countries.		To	illustrate	the	nature	of	the	empirical	puzzle	that	I	want	to	solve,	consider	Figures	1.3	and	1.4,	which	draw	upon	data	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey	to	identify	the	countries	in	which	China	and	the	United	States,	respectively,	exerted	the	most	and	least	development	policy	influence	between	2004	and	2013.	China	and	the	United	States	evidently	have	different	spheres	of	influence.		Only	one	developing	country	(Montenegro)	is	among	both	the	ten	countries	most	influenced	by	China	and	the	ten	countries	most	influenced	by	the	United	States.		It	is	also	noteworthy	that	many,	although	certainly	not	all,	of	the	countries	where	the	U.S.	had	agenda-setting	influence	are	democracies.	By	contrast,	China	appears	to	have	exerted	substantial	development	policy	influence	across	a	diverse	group	of	democratic	and	autocratic	countries,	including	Laos,	Montenegro,	Cameroon,	Tanzania,	and	Sudan.	These	descriptive	patterns	beg	for	a	theoretical	explanation,	and	more	fine-	grained	statistical	analysis.		
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Figure 1.3: China’s Agenda-Setting Influence, By Country 
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76. Iraq 
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70. Côte D'Ivoire 
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66. Senegal 
65. Rwanda 
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62. Bolivia 
61. Burundi 
60. Zambia 
59. Kenya 
58. Dominican Republic 
57. China 
56. Sri Lanka 
55. Ethiopia 
Figure 1.4: U.S. Agenda-Setting Influence, By Country  
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The	goal	of	this	monograph	is	to	account	for	this	rich	donor-recipient	level	variation,	but	in	a	way	that	produces	generalizable	conclusions	rather	than	many	idiosyncratic	findings	that	are	specific	to	individual	donor-recipient	dyads.		I	will	evaluate	which	types	of	donors	exert	policy	influence	in	which	types	of	developing	countries	by	leveraging	the	micro-data	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey,	which	is	a	first-of-its-kind	survey	that	leveraged	the	opinions	and	insights	of	6,750	development	policy	makers	and	experts	to	better	understand	the	qualities	and	practices	that	make	development	partners	more	and	less	influential.		The	data	gathered	by	a	team	of	researchers	at	the	College	of	William	and	Mary	–	in	partnership	with	NORC	at	the	University	of	Chicago	--	includes	information	on	the	influence,	performance,	and	trustworthiness	of	over	100	Western	and	non-Western	development	partners	(Custer	et	al.	2015).		As	such,	this	novel	data	source	will	allow	me	to	systematically	test	the	policy	influence	of	development	partners,	as	experienced,	observed	and	reported	by	host	government	officials	in	aid-receiving	countries.				My	ideational	theory	of	homophily	is	based	on	the	following	proposition:	donors	will	exert	more	development	policy	influence	in	(a)	countries	that	share	their	regime	type	and	economic	policy	orientation,	and	(b)	with	policymakers	who	share	their	causal	and	principled	beliefs	about	development	policy.				To	illustrate	how	different	types	of	donors	export	distinct	“development	models”	to	their	counterpart	countries,	consider	the	way	in	which	the	BRICS	have	promoted	“South-South	cooperation”	as	a	distinct	alternative	to	Western	development	policy.		The	BRICS	promote	a	South-South	narrative	and	emphasize	their	own	identities	as	developing	countries	that	escaped	poverty	without	adopting	the	traditional	“Washington	Consensus”	policies.		Their	basic	pitch	is	that	they	understand	the	challenges	that	developing	countries	face	better	than	Western	donors	and	their	development	experiences,	policies,	and	insights	should	be	uniquely	relevant	and	resonant	with	leaders	in	the	developing	world	(Modi	2011;	Quadir	2013).		If	one	accepts	this	argument	at	face	value,	it	suggests	that	ideational	resonance	between	a	donor	and	a	recipient	will	not	only	determine	which	donors	have	development	policy	influence	but	also	where	they	will	exert	such	influence.			There	is	anecdotal	evidence	that	suggests	different	types	of	developing	countries	may	prefer	the	development	policy	ideas	and	models	of	some	donors	more	than	others.		President	Ellen	Johnson-Sirleaf	of	Liberia,	for	example,	is	a	vocal	proponent	of	Western	development	policies	and	practices.		A	considerable	amount	of	her	time	and	energy	in	office	was	spent	enacting	reforms	to	meet	the	Millennium	Challenge	Corporation	(MCC)’s	policy	performance	criteria.		She	has	publicly	praised	the	principles	underlying	these	reforms,	saying	that	“we	strive	to	meet	these	benchmarks	because	it	is	what	our	people	deserve.		These	are	our	own	priorities	because	if	we	cannot	achieve	them,	stability	and	prosperity	will	remain	fleeting	dreams”	(Johnson-	Sirleaf	2008).		Her	explicit	link	between	the	model	espoused	by	the	MCC	reforms	and	Liberia’s	success	underscores	her	belief	in	the	power	of	a	Western	development	model.			By	contrast,	the	leaders	of	other	countries	have	demonstrated	a	preference	for	the	development	models	and	policy	ideas	being	promoted	by	emerging	powers,	such	as	China.		Abdoulaye	Wade,	the	former	President	of	Senegal,	has	chastised	Western	donors	for	their	
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insensitivity	to	the	conditions	facing	developing	country	policymakers	and	praised	China’s	alternative	approach:	“China’s	approach	to	our	needs	is	simply	better	adapted	than	the	slow	and	sometimes	patronising	post-colonial	approach	of	European	investors,	donor	organisations	and	nongovernmental	organisations.	...	I	am	a	firm	believer	in	good	governance	and	the	rule	of	law.	But	when	bureaucracy	and	senseless	red	tape	impede	our	ability	to	act—and	when	poverty	persists	while	international	functionaries	drag	their	feet—	African	leaders	have	an	obligation	to	opt	for	swifter	solutions”	(Wade	2008).		However,	a	collection	of	anecdotes	does	not	constitute	systematic	evidence	and	the	goal	of	this	study	is	to	identify	generalizable	empirical	findings.		To	preview	my	main	findings,	I	recover	partial	evidence	in	support	of	the	homophily	evidence.		While	most	recipient	states	do	not	exhibit	a	preference	for	donors	who	share	their	regime	type	and	economic	policy	orientation,	democratic,	free-	market	recipient	states	are	an	important	exception	to	this	rule.		These	states,	as	well	as	developing	world	policymakers	who	were	educated	and	socialized	in	democratic,	free-market	countries,	consistently	report	that	they	embrace	the	development	policy	advice	of	democratic,	free-	market	donors	more	so	than	any	other	donor	type.		These	findings	suggest	that,	in	some	cases,	ideational	factors	such	as	the	values	and	beliefs	of	policymakers	facilitate	the	adoption	of	externally-informed	or	-influenced	reforms.		In	this	way,	my	study	contributes	to	an	emerging	body	of	literature	on	the	causal	influence	of	policymakers’	professional	and	educational	backgrounds	(Gohlmann	and	Vaubel	2007;	Parks	2014;	Mikosch	2011;	Farvaque	et	al.	2009;	Farvaque	et	al.	2011;	Gift	and	Krcmaric	2015).										The	rest	of	this	monograph	is	structured	in	the	following	manner.		Chapter	2	proposes	a	general	theory	of	policy	influence	that	has	different	observable	implications	for	different	types	of	donors	and	recipient	countries,	and	outlines	eight	hypotheses.		These	hypotheses	are	then	systematically	tested	and	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	Chapter	4	concludes	and	provides	suggestions	for	future	research.	I	have	also	included	an	appendix,	which	includes	a	series	of	robustness	checks	on	the	core	empirical	findings	reported	in	Chapter	3.							
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
  
18 
18 
	
	
Chapter	2	
	
	
	
Introduction:	
	Understanding	how	donors	influence	the	development	policy	behavior	of	government	officials	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	requires	that	one	first	understand	the	nature	and	origin	of	a	donor’s	development	policy	orientation	(Alden	2007;	Ranis	et	al.	2011).		Previous	research	suggests	that	the	development	policy	beliefs	held	by	government	officials	in	donor	countries	are	often	formed	on	the	basis	of	their	own	country’s	history	and	development	experience	(Wade	1996;	Babb	2009),	and	that	these	causal	and	principled	beliefs	about	development	policy	influence	the	substantive	focus	of	the	strategies	and	instruments	used	by	donor	countries	to	influence	the	policy	priorities	and	decisions	of	developing	country	governments	(Easterly	2003;	Eviatar	2003).			However,	there	is	virtually	no	systematic	empirical	research	on	the	conditions	under	which	the	principled	and	causal	beliefs	of	donors	influence	the	policy	behavior	of	their	recipient	country	counterparts.	My	objective	in	this	chapter	is	to	put	forward	an	ideational	theory	about	which	donors	exert	policy	influence	over	which	recipients	–	and	why.			I	will	advance	the	idea	that	donors	and	recipients	vary	along	two	important	dimensions:	economic	policy	and	governance.		I	use	a	two	by	two	matrix	to	categorize	both	donor	and	recipient	countries,	as	seen	in	Table	2.1.				
Table 2.1: Model Matrix 	 Democracy	 Autocracy	
Free-	Market	Economy	
Category	1	(Democratic,	Free-Market	Economy)	
Category	3	(Autocratic,	Free-Market	Economy)	
State-	Led	Economy	 Category	2	(Democratic,	State-Led	Economy)	
Category	4	(Autocratic,	State-Led	Economy)			To	derive	plausible	hypotheses	about	the	motivations	and	tactics	of	each	donor	grouping	characterized	in	the	2x2	matrix	in	Table	2.1,	one	must	demonstrate	that	each	donor	grouping	consists	of	a	group	of	countries	that	have	had	similar	formative	experiences	at	
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home	(Patten	2011;	Nelson	2014).	If	one	can	demonstrate	that	these	seemingly	diverse	groupings	of	countries	have	had	similar	development	experiences	and	that	these	experiences	have	helped	shape	a	common	set	of	causal	and	principled	beliefs	about	development	policy,	then	there	is	a	strong	a	priori	justification	to	test	whether	these	donor	groupings	promote	similar	types	of	development	policies	among	low-income	and	middle-income	countries.	
	
Democratic,	Free	Market	States:	
	The	first	grouping	of	donor	countries	from	the	2x2	matrix	in	Table	2.1	consists	of	democratic,	free	market	states.		Most	of	the	countries	that	fall	within	this	category		--	including	the	United	States,	Canada,	Australia,	Japan,	New	Zealand,	the	United	Kingdom,	and	much	of	mainland	Europe	--	emerged	from	authoritarian	or	monarchic	systems	of	governance	and	eventually	succeeded	in	creating	democratic	states	and	building	open	economies	(Rueschemeyer,	Stephens,	and	Stephens	1992).		Countries	in	this	category	also	tend	to	embrace	both	foreign	policy	and	international	development	objectives	that	reflect	their	own	experiences	with	economic	and	political	development	(Dietrich	2016).		Consider	the	United	States,	long	considered	a	bastion	of	democracy	and	neo-	liberal	economic	thought.		Since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	both	Republican	and	Democratic	administrations	have	actively	sought	to	promote	free	market	policies	and	democratic	governance	overseas	(Dunning	2004;	Bermeo	2011).		The	Clinton	administration’s	1994	National	Security	Strategy	states	that	“[a]ll	of	America’s	strategic	interests	–	from	promoting	prosperity	at	home	to	checking	global	threats	abroad	before	they	threaten	our	territory	–	are	served	by	enlarging	the	community	of	democratic	and	free	market	nations.	Thus,	working	with	new	democratic	states	to	help	preserve	them	as	democracies	committed	to	free	markets	and	respect	for	human	rights,	is	a	key	part	of	our	national	security	strategy.	…	Our	long-term	goal	is	a	world	in	which	each	of	the	major	powers	is	democratic,	with	many	other	nations	joining	the	community	of	market	democracies	as	well.”2		In	the	preamble	to	its	2002	National	Security	Strategy,	the	Bush	administration	went	further,	stating:	“The	great	struggles	of	the	twentieth	century	between	liberty	and	totalitarianism	ended	with	a	decisive	victory	for	the	forces	of	freedom—and	a	single	sustainable	model	for	national	success:	freedom,	democracy,	and	free	enterprise.	In	the	twenty-first	century,	only	nations	that	share	a	commitment	to	protecting	basic	human	rights	and	guaranteeing	political	and	economic	freedom	will	be	able	to	unleash	the	potential	of	their	people	and	assure	their	future	prosperity.”3		The	Obama	Administration	has	reaffirmed	many	of	the	same	principles	and	values.	It	asserts	in	its	2015	National	Security	Strategy	that	“all	countries	will	benefit	when	we	open	markets	further”	and	“we	are	upholding	our	enduring	commitment	to	the	advancement	of																																																									2	National	Security	Strategy,	Clinton	Administration,	1994.		3	National	Security	Strategy,	Bush	Administration,	2002.		
  
20 
20 
democracy	and	human	rights	and	building	new	coalitions	to	combat	corruption	and	to	support	open	governments	and	open	societies.”	This	strategy	document	also	indicates	that	democracy	is	an	“inevitable”	part	of	the	development	process.4		In	support	of	this	strategy,	the	U.S.	Government	has	developed	a	wide	array	of	policies	and	programs	to	promote	democratic	governance	in	the	developing	world.		The	Millennium	Challenge	Corporation	(MCC),	for	example,	is	a	performance-based	aid	program	that	provides	a	financial	incentive	for	developing	countries	to	pursue	democratic	reform	and	consolidation.		Its	eligibility	criteria	for	funding	include	measures	of	whether	countries	provide	political	rights	and	protect	civil	liberties	(MCC	2016).		Democracy	promotion	programs,	such	as	those	supported	by	the	National	Endowment	for	Democracy	(NED),	also	provide	assistance	to	democratic	reformers	in	the	developing	world	(Carothers	2006;	Bush	2015).	Educational	and	student	exchange	programs,	such	as	the	State	Department’s	Fulbright	program,	are	also	designed	to	help	spread	democratic	values,	as	those	who	are	trained	and	socialized	in	educational	institutions	in	the	U.S.	or	in	other	democratic	donor	states	may	contribute	to	the	promotion	and	diffusion	of	democratic	values	and	practices	in	their	home	countries	(Atkinson,	2010;	Weymouth	and	MacPherson,	2012).		The	United	States	is	not	alone.	Many	donors	that	have	embraced	a	democratic,	free	market	economy	orientation	(Category	1	in	Table	2.1)	have	also	formulated	policies	and	programs	to	promote	democratic	governance	abroad.	Lithuania,	for	example,	supports	democratization	through	knowledge	sharing	initiatives	in	neighboring	countries	such	as	Belarus.		Lithuania’s	own	past	as	a	communist	country	that	experienced	a	democratic	transition	has	arguably	made	it	more	inclined	to	support	democratization	in	neighboring	countries	(Jonavicius,	2008;	Delcour,	2015).				One	can	also	see	the	importance	of	a	donor’s	experience	with	democracy	“at	home”	in	the	way	that	Germany	and	other	European	donor	countries	have	embraced	a	so-called	‘developmental	approach’	to	democracy	promotion.		This	approach	supports	“democracy	as	process”,	rather	than	“democracy	as	product”,	meaning	democratization	is	part	of	a	larger	reform	program	rather	than	an	end	in	itself	(Caruthers,	2009;	Youngs,	2007).		Scholars	note	that	this	process	generally	differs	from	that	of	the	United	States,	which	follows	a	more	“political	approach”	(Caruthers,	2009).		Some	scholars	have	attributed	this	transatlantic	difference	to	the	unique	development	experiences	of	different	donors,	with	Germany	in	particular	and	Europe	more	generally	experiencing	considerably	more	unrest	during	democratic	transitions	than	the	United	States		(e.g.	Caruthers	2009).					Similarly,	previous	research	suggests	that	donor	states	espousing	neoliberal	economic	policy	values	and	beliefs	at	home	also	tend	to	promote	such	values	and	beliefs	abroad		(Dietrich	2016).	Neoliberal	economic	policy	beliefs	were	famously	codified	and	labeled	by	John	Williamson	as	the	“Washington	Consensus”	(Gore	2000).		Williamson	originally	coined	this	term	to	refer	to	a	set	of	economic	reforms	that	Washington	agreed	were	needed	in	Latin	America	in	the	late	1980s,	but	the	term	is	now	commonly	used	to	refer	to	a	set	of																																																									4	National	Security	Strategy,	Obama	Administration,	2015.	Page	20.		
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market-oriented	economic	policies	that	include	trade	liberalization,	privatization,	and	deregulation	(Williamson	2000).			Category	1	donor	countries	–	i.e.	those	with	a	democratic,	free	market	economy	orientation	--	employ	various	policies	and	programs	to	promote	their	economic	policy	priorities	in	the	developing	world.		For	example,	they	advocate	for	developing	country	participation	in	IMF-monitored	reform	programs	(Momani	2007),	sponsor	bilateral	aid	programs	that	aim	to	expand	economic	freedom	in	the	countries	where	they	are	implemented	(Ray	et	al.	2006;	Schueth	2010),	and	encourage	countries	to	join	the	WTO	(Hawkins	et	al.	2006),	which	in	turn	encourages	its	members	to	adopt	market	reforms.	(Sutherland	2008).		Another	key	strategy	adopted	by	many	democratic,	free	market	donor	states	is	the	use	of	educational	exchange	programs	to	socialize	current	--	or	future	--	leaders	from	the	developing	world	to	their	economic	policy	values	and	beliefs	(Richmond	2003;	Nye	2004;	Spilimbergo	2009;	Atkinson	2010;	Weymouth	and	MacPherson	2012;	Murat	2014).	The	rationale	for	such	programs	is	that	“ideas	travel	across	geographic	borders	when	exchange	participants	return	home.	Once	home,	participants	may	hold	their	own	government	institutions	accountable	through	overt	actions	such	as	protests.	But	more	likely	their	influence	is	more	subtle.	Some	participants	may	enter	into	government	service	and	the	ideas	that	had	been	learned	abroad	may	be	used	to	reform	existing	practices	or	political	institutions.	Others	may	already	hold	politically	powerful	positions	in	their	governments	and	can	directly	alter	policies”	(Atkinson	2010:2).			Notable	examples	include	the	United	States’	Fulbright	Scholarship	program	and	the	United	Kingdom’s	Chevening	Scholarship	program.		Chevening	Scholarships	are	described	by	the	British	Government	as	“an	important	element	in	Britain’s	public	diplomacy	effort	and	bring	professionals,	who	have	already	displayed	outstanding	leadership	talents,	to	study	in	the	UK”	(Foreign	Commonwealth	Office	2015).	The	stated	objective	of	the	Chevening	scholarship	program	is	to	“support	foreign	policy	priorities	and	achieve	FCO	objectives	by	creating	lasting	positive	relationships	with	future	leaders,	influencers,	and	decision-makers”	(Foreign	Commonwealth	Office	2015).		Similarly,	U.S.	Government’s	Fulbright	Program	seeks	“to	assist	in	the	development	of	friendly,	sympathetic,	and	peaceful	relations	between	the	United	States	and	other	countries	of	the	world”5.				Many	of	these	programs	target	individuals	who,	in	principle,	will	be	able	to	take	the	ideas	that	they	internalize	in	the	host	country	and	draw	on	these	ideas	when	they	are	shaping	new	policies	and	programs	in	their	countries	of	origin.6		Several	programs	explicitly	state	this	objective	in	their	selection	criteria,	including	the	Chevening	program,	which	seeks	“future	leaders,	influencers,	and	decision-makers	from	all	over	the	world”	who	have																																																									5	Fulbright	Hays	Act.	22	U.S.C.	§	2451	(1996).	6	Previous	research	demonstrates	that	the	vast	majority	of	students	who	study	in	the	United	States	return	to	their	country	of	origin	or	another	country	after	completing	their	studies,	and	many	of	these	students	profess	interest	in	working	for	organizations	that	influence	policy	decisions,	such	as	government	and	international	organizations.		See:	Aslanbeigui,	Nahid,	and	Veronica	Montecinos.	1998.	"Foreign	Students	in	U.S.	Doctoral	Programs."	Journal	of	Economic	Perspectives,	12(3):	171-182.	
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“already	displayed	outstanding	leadership	talent”	(Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office	2015).		The	Mason	Fellows	Program	at	Harvard	University	and	the	White	House’s	Young	African	Leaders	Initiative	(YALI)	similarly	choose	candidates	who	are	already	in	positions	of	influence	or	mid-	career	professionals	with	demonstrated	leadership	potential.	The	Mason	Fellows	Program	screens	applicants	based	on	“their	leadership	abilities,	their	commitment	to	public	service,	and	their	academic	achievement”	(Harvard	Kennedy	School	2016).		The	Mandela	Fellowship	Program,	which	supports	YALI,	has	a	similar	goal:	“the	Fellowship	will	provide	1,000	outstanding	young	leaders	from	Sub-Saharan	Africa	with	the	opportunity	to	hone	their	skills	at	a	U.S.	higher	education	institution	with	support	for	professional	development	after	they	return	home”	(YALI	2016).7		There	is	also	some	evidence	that	these	programs	are	effective.	Spilimbergo	(2009)	finds	that	officials	educated	in	democratic	countries	generally	promote	democratic	principles	in	in	their	home	country	upon	their	return.8		Weymouth	and	MacPherson	(2012)	find	that	economists	trained	in	US	higher	education	institutions	--	and	sponsored	through	the	Fulbright	Program	--	have	played	a	key	role	in	diffusing	liberal	trade	policy	reforms	around	the	world.	Atkinson	(2010:2)	finds	that	“US-	hosted	exchange	program	can	play	an	important	role	in	the	diffusion	of	liberal	values	and	practices	across	the	borders	of	authoritarian	states”.		She	finds	that	both	civilian	and	military	exchange	programs	to	the	United	States	improve	government	respect	for	basic	human	freedoms	in	the	home	countries	of	the	individual	who	was	educated	abroad.	Oleg	Kalugin,	a	former	KGB	General,	is	quoted	as	saying	that	"[educational]	exchanges	...	played	a	tremendous	role	in	the	erosion	of	the	Soviet	system.	They	opened	up	a	closed	society.	They	greatly	influenced	younger	people	who	saw	the	world	with	more	open	eyes,	and	they	kept	infecting	more	and	more	people	over	the	years"	(Richmond	2003:32).		Demir	et	al.	(2000)	discuss	this	phenomenon	in	the	Turkish	context,	finding	that	“the	Fulbright	experience	contributed	to	the	social	and	economic	development	of	Turkey,	because	the	besides	the	universities,	some	of	the	Fulbrighters	were	working	in	positions	that	entailed	policy	making	for	Turkey”.		While	their	study	does	not	specifically	discuss	the	specific	types	of	policies	that	these	individuals	attempted	to	influence,	it	does	suggest	a	“broadened”	worldview	from	their	time	abroad,	which	most	likely	included	at	least	some	of	their	host	country’s	beliefs.				However,	a	key	question	of	interest	for	my	study	is	under	what	conditions	donors	with	a	democratic	and	free-market	economy	orientation	are	likely	to	succeed	in	transfering	their	policy	ideas	to	counterpart	country	officials	in	the	developing	world.		Previous	studies	suggest	that	economically	and	politically	liberal	donor	states	are	more	likely	to	form	relationships	with	and	give	aid	to	developing	countries	that	share	their	policy	beliefs	(Murat	2014;	Dreher	et.	al	2015b;	Chwieroth	2013).		Specifically,	Chwieroth	(2013)	and																																																									7	The	Mason	Fellows	Program	and	the	Mandela	Washington	Fellowship,	for	example,	provide	continued	access	to	networks	in	the	host	country	as	a	means	to	encourage	policy	change.	8	Interestingly,	these	principles	tend	to	reflect	the	type	of	democracy	practiced	by	their	home	country:	enacted	policies	differed	for	individuals	educated	in	Russia	compared	to	those	educated	in	the	United	States,	for	example.	Spilimbergo,	2009.	
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Dreher	et	al.	(2015b)	show	that	bilateral	donors	more	often	extend	aid	to	countries	that	share	their	ideological	beliefs.		Similarly,	Nelson	(2014)	finds	that	IMF	deals	become	“comparatively	sweeter”	for	countries	that	share	the	organization’s	neoliberal	ideology.			These	theoretical	considerations	bring	me	to	my	first	two	hypotheses,	which	are	based	on	the	homophily	(“bird	of	a	feather	flock	together”)	principal:		H1:		Democratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	democratic	governance	and	neoliberal	economic	policies.		H2:		Democratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-income	and	middle	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	democratic,	free	market	countries.		
	 	
Democratic,	State-	Led	Economy:	
	The	next	category	of	donors	that	I	consider	is	a	grouping	of	democratic	donors	that	embrace	state-led	economic	policies.	These	“category	2”	donors	fall	in	the	southwestern	quadrant	of	the	2x2	in	Table	2.1.	Most	of	the	donors	in	this	category	(e.g.	India,	Brazil,	Turkey,	Greece)	represent	relatively	new	entrants	into	the	international	aid	market.		As	such,	information	about	these	donors	and	how	they	attempt	to	transmit	their	development	policy	beliefs	to	other	countries	is	scarce.				However,	there	are	still	some	descriptive	observations	that	one	can	make	about	the	underlying	beliefs	and	foreign	policy	aims	of	these	donors.		Previous	research	demonstrates	that	the	economic	reforms	that	enabled	these	countries	to	escape	poverty	are	substantially	different	from	those	pursued	by	other	donors	in	the	other	quadrants	of	the	2x2	in	Table	2.1	(Rodrik	2003,	2005;	Clark	and	Wolcott	2003).	For	example,	India’s	economic	development	is	attributed	in	part	to	its	adoption	of	socialist-inspired	policies	of	state	intervention	in	the	market	during	the	1950s	(Bhagwati	and	Desai	1975).	Brazil	has	also	pursued	policies	that	involve	heavy	state	intervention	in	the	economy		(Rodrik	2005).			There	also	are	reasons	to	believe	that	democratic	reforms	experienced	by	“category	2”	donors	have	informed	and	influenced	their	policy	values,	beliefs,	and	objectives	vis-à-vis	developing	countries.		South	Africa,	for	example,	experienced	a	democratic	transition	in	the	late	1990s,	and	has	since	then	assumed	a	regional	leadership	role	in	the	promotion	of	democracy	beyond	its	borders	(Huber	2015;	Schonwalder	2014;	Khadiagala	and	Nganje	2015;	Landsberg	2000).	Brazil	and	India	have	also	overcome	legacies	of	authoritarianism	and	colonialism	to	embrace	strong	systems	of	democratic	governance	(McMillan	2008;	Skidmore	2009;	Ames	2001).			They	too	have	embraced	the	promotion	of	democratic	governance	as	foreign	policy	objectives,	albeit	in	ways	that	are	somewhat	more	nuanced	and	understated	than	South	Africa	(Stuenkel	and	Jacob	2010;	Sahoo	et	al.	2015).					
  
24 
24 
Casual	observation	suggests	that,	unlike	the	donors	that	fall	in	the	northeastern	and	southeastern	quadrants	of	the	2x2	in	Figure	1,	many	“category	2”	donors	are	actively	engaged	in	external	democracy	promotion	efforts.		Take,	for	example,	South	Africa’s	principal	instrument	for	the	delivery	of	foreign	assistance:	the	Africa	Renaissance	and	International	Cooperation	Fund.	One	of	the	explicit,	strategic	objectives	of	this	Fund	is	“to	promote	democracy	and	good	governance.”	(DIRCO	2013)	Its	project	portfolio	includes	election	monitoring	in	Madagascar	and	Zimbabwe,	and	electoral	administration	activities	in	Guinea	Bissau	(DIRCO	2013).	Vickers	(2012)	suggests	that	South	Africa	may	in	fact	have	a	comparative	advantage	in	democracy	promotion	due	to	their	fairly	recent	post-	apartheid	transition.		South	Africa’s	willingness	to	employ	democratic	conditionality	also	speaks	to	this	seriousness	with	which	the	authorities	in	Pretoria	take	the	objective	of	democracy	promotion	(Vickers	2012).9			South	Africa	is	not	alone.	Poland,	Indonesia,	Romania,	Turkey	and	Slovenia	–	other	category	two	donors	–	also	administer	foreign	assistance	programs	with	a	focus	on	democratic	governance	(Pospiezna,	2010;	Carothers	and	Youngs	2011;	Jonavicius	2008;	Petrova	2014).	Turkey,	for	example,	is	actively	engaged	in	efforts	to	promote	democratic	governance	through	the	activities	of	the	Turkish	Cooperation	and	Coordination	Agency	(TIKA).	TIKA	programs	involve	efforts	to	train	parliamentarians	and	members	of	the	judiciary,	strengthen	NGO	capacity,	and	increase	the	capacity	of	central	governments	and	local	governments	to	deliver	public	services	(Aydin-Duzgit	and	Keyman	2014).	Poland	has	developed	its	own	unique	set	of	cross-	border	cooperation	policies	and	programs	to	encourage	democratic	change	within	neighboring	countries,	such	as	Ukraine	and	Belarus	(Pospiezna	2010)10.			There	are	also	reasons	to	believe	that	formative	historical	experiences	with	economic	growth	and	development	influence	the	contemporary	international	development	policies	and	programs	that	category	2	donor	countries	prioritize	and	pursue.	Specifically,	there	is	some	evidence	that	public	sector	decision-makers	in	these	countries	are	more	skeptical	about	allowing	the	free	market	to	operate	in	an	unfettered	way.	Consider,	for	example,	Mozambique’s	recent	adoption	of	Brazil’s	More	Food	International	(MFI)	and	Food	Purchase	(PAA)	programs.	The	PAA	program	in	particular	highlights	the	role	of	state	intervention	in	implementing	food	purchase	programs.		The	program	operates	in	the	following	manner:	“this	National	Programme	purchases	a	wide	variety	of	food	produced	by	family	farmers	without	a	bidding	process.	The	food	is	then	distributed	to	people	in	food	and	nutrition	insecurity	as	well	as	to	those	served	by	social	assistance	networks,	public	facilities	for	food	and	nutrition	security,	and	public	and	philanthropic	education																																																									9	South	Africa’s	2011	bailout	loan	to	Swaziland	stipulated	that	the	Swazi	authorities	undertake	democracy	and	rule	of	law	reforms	(Vickers	2012).		10	Poland’s	unique	approach	to	democracy	promotion	reflects	its	own	experience	with	democratization	in	that	Western-assisted	civil	society	organizations,	such	as	Solidarity,	played	a	pivotal	role.	Specifically,	media	and	civil	society	organizations	are	the	primary	recipients	of	Polish	aid	to	Belarus,	reflecting	the	government’s	underlying	belief	in	“[passing]	on	the	legacy	of	Solidarity”	for	encouraging	democratic	transition	and	consolidation.	(Pospiezna,	2010:176).				
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institutions.”	(PAA	Africa	2013).	The	government	thus	plays	a	critical	distributive	role	in	this	program,	buying	and	allocating	food	to	those	in	need.				However,	traditional	aid	programs	are	not	the	only	instruments	that	category	2	donors	use	to	transmit	their	ideas	about	development	policy	to	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	(Milani	2015;	McCormick	2008).		They	have	also	developed	scholarship	and	training	programs	to	expand	their	soft	power.		Greece,	for	example,	has	a	scholarship	program	that	brings	developing	country	nationals	to	Greece	for	a	course	of	study	and	seeks	to	train	the	next	generation	of	leaders	in	the	developing	world.	Indeed,	its	stated	objective	is	“the	creation	of	executives,	capable	to	contribute,	in	the	future,	to	the	development	of	their	[countries]	of	origin”	(Scholarships4Dev	2010).			In	Brazil	(another	category	2	donor	country),	a	wide	variety	of	ministries	offer	professional	training	and	advice	to	developing	countries	nationals	(Milani	2015).	Its	social	policy	expertise	is	in	particularly	high	demand	among	developing	country	officials.	The	“Bolsa	Familia”	program,	designed	and	implemented	by	the	Brazilian	Ministry	of	Social	Development	and	Fight	against	Hunger	(MDS),	is	widely	regarded	as	a	spectacularly	successful	poverty	reduction	program	(The	Economist	2010;	Pachecho	Santos	et	al.	2011).	As	such,	it	is	the	subject	of	study	and	emulation	by	outsiders	(World	Bank	2014;	Flatjord	2015).	MDS	reports	that,	between	2011	and	2014,	it	hosted	345	delegations	from	other	countries	visiting	it	to	learn	more	about	Bolsa	Familia	and	other	MDS-coordinated	social	policy	programs	in	Brazil	(MDS	2015).	MDS	also	runs	seminars	on	social	policy	in	developing	countries	and	supports	an	online	platform	called	Mundo	Sem	Pobreza	(World	Without	Poverty)	that	facilitates	real-time	information	sharing	between	policymakers	around	the	world	who	are	designing	and	implementing	social	programs	(World	Bank	2014;	Flatjord	2015).			Among	democratic	donors	that	embrace	state-led	economic	policies,	India	is	perhaps	the	country	with	the	longest	standing	professional	education	program	that	aims	to	increase	the	influence	of	the	sponsor	vis-à-vis	its	developing	country	counterparts.	Shortly	after	India	lost	the	Sino-Indian	War	of	1962,	the	Ministry	of	External	Affairs	(MEA)	decided	that	it	needed	to	expand	India's	influence	in	South	and	Southeast	Asia	(Mukherjee	2015).		The	Indian	Technical	and	Economic	Cooperation	(ITEC)	program	was	one	of	the	key	instruments	that	it	used	to	support	this	“charm	offensive.”	The	ITEC	program	has	two	components:	it	sends	Indian	experts	to	developing	countries	to	provide	technical	expertise,	and	it	brings	developing	country	officials	to	India	for	professional	education.		Mullen	and	Ganguly	(2012)	argue	that	“[a]lthough	ITEC	was	small	in	monetary	terms,	it	bore	fruit	over	the	subsequent	decades	as	many	bureaucrats	and	politicians	from	other	developed	countries	received	their	educational	training	in	India.	…	This	program	…	has	…	provided	for	good	future	relations	with	recipient	countries.	Take	the	example	of	Afghan	President	Hamid	Karzai,	who	attended	university	in	India	and	enjoys	warmer	relations	with	India	than	with	neighboring	Pakistan.”	Agrawal	(2007:	9)	makes	a	similar	point	about	the	approximately	40,000	alumni	of	India’s	ITEC	program,	arguing	that	they	effectively	represent	“a	large	constituency	of	senior	public	officials	with	a	friendly	disposition	toward	India.”	
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There	is	also	some	anecdotal	evidence	that	these	category	two	donors	have	had	some	success	transmitting	their	unique	beliefs	about	development	policy	to	countries	that	are	
predisposed	to	embrace	such	policy	ideas	in	the	first	place	(Milani	2015;	Zanella	and	Milhorance	2016).	Returning	to	the	earlier	example	of	Brazil’s	MFA	and	PAA	and	programs,	it	is	likely	no	accident	that	Mozambique	has	embraced	these	programs.	Indeed,	there	is	some	evidence	that	the	Mozambican	authorities	may	believe	in	likely	effectiveness	of	such	programs	and	embraced	the	underlying	principles	to	guide	and	govern	these	programs	(Cabral	et	al.	2016;	Clements	2015).			In	light	of	these	theoretical	considerations,	I	will	test	the	following	hypotheses:	
	H3:	Democratic	donor	states	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	democratic	governance	and	state-	led	economic	policies.			H4:	Democratic	donor	states	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-income	and	middle	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	democratic	donor	countries	with	state-	led	economies.	
	
	
Autocratic,	Free	Market	States:		
	Autocratic,	free-	market	donors	represent	yet	another	class	of	“competitors”	in	the	international	aid	market.	However,	relatively	little	is	known	about	the	nature,	allocation,	and	effects	of	their	aid	policies	and	programs	(Kharas	2015;	Shushan	and	Marcoux	2011).			
	The	majority	of	the	donors	–	Qatar,	UAE,	and	Kuwait	–	that	fall	in	this	“category	three”	grouping	of	autocratic	and	free-market	donors	have	had	development	experiences	that	set	them	apart	from	other	types	of	donors.		These	states	were	once	part	of	Islamic	Empires	founded	on	a	distinct	set	of	religious	principles,	but	even	as	these	empires	expanded	their	territorial	boundaries,	the	imposition	of	Muslim	beliefs	and	ideology	was	rarely	a	priority.	They	were	instead	focused	on	promoting	harmony	and	unity	among	diverse	populations	to	ensure	political	stability	(Facchini	2011).				Today,	these	countries	are	guided	by	a	unique	blend	of	governance	and	economic	principles	that	stem	not	only	from	their	histories	as	conquerors,	but	also	as	colonized	states.		Britain’s	historical	involvement	in	the	region	brought	to	bear	one	set	of	values,	which	can	be	seen	primarily	in	the	nature	of	their	economies:	donors	from	the	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	generally	have	higher	levels	of	economic	freedom	than	other	Muslim	majority	countries	(Facchini	2011).		Authoritarianism	has	also	long	been	a	dominant	feature	of	their	governance	systems.		This	can	be	attributed	to	institutions	from	their	pre-colonial,	monarchic	past	continuing	to	influence	modern-	day	governance	(Acemoglu	and	Robinson	2012;	Fish	2002).			These	donors	do	not	openly	or	explicitly	profess	an	interest	in	exporting	ideas	about	authoritarianism.	They	instead	claim	that	their	motivations	for	aid	provision	are	
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humanitarian	and	religious	in	nature.		The	Islamic	principle	of	zakat	mandates	a	fund	to	help	poor,	vulnerable	populations,	underscoring	calls	for	Muslim	solidarity	in	cases	of	humanitarian	crises	(Barakat	and	Zyck	2010).	And	it	is	true	that	many	aid	recipients	of	category	three	donors	share	the	religious	ideologies	of	their	state	sponsors.11			However,	authoritarian,	free-	market	donors	also	provide	large	sums	of	unconditional	funding	to	some	countries,	and	it	is	at	least	plausible	that	these	counterpart	countries	will	emulate	the	development	models	that	their	foreign	sponsors	have	pursued,	due	to	the	perception	that	these	donors	are	stable	and	successful	countries.		Consider	for	example	Qatar	and	UAE,	two	category	three	donors	that	provided	large	sums	of	unconditional	funding	to	the	Egyptian	government	in	the	wake	of	the	Arab	Spring.		While	the	largesse	of	these	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	donors	may	very	well	have	prevented	a	complete	collapse	of	the	Egyptian	state,	their	aid	did	not	come	with	any	expectations	that	the	recipient	would	embrace	democratic	governance	values	and	practices,	potentially	granting	the	Egyptian	authorities	more	flexibility	to	elude	other	external	pressures	for	democratic	governance	(Coates-	Ulrichsen	2014).		Qatari	aid	in	particular	has	been	criticized	for	a	“hands	off”	policy,	that	funds	groups	with	varying	motivations	and	purposes	(Dickinson	2014;	Kirkpatrick	2014).		Thus,	Qatar	and	UAE	may	exert	significant	“passive”	influence	over	the	policy	direction	of	countries	like	Egypt,	in	that	they	may	affect	governance	and	economic	policy	outcomes	without	actively	promoting	authoritarianism	or	particular	economic	policies.			Donors	can	exert	influence	either	through	“push”	mechanisms,	such	as	conditionality,	that	actively	promote	the	uptake	of	a	particular	set	of	policy	values	and	ideas,	or	through	“pull	mechanisms”,	like	emulation	(Jacoby,	2006;	Dolowitz	and	Marsh	2000;	Stone	2003).		The	idea	of	“passive”	influence	implies	that	autocratic,	free-	market	donors	likely	exert	more	influence	through	pull	mechanisms	than	other	categories	of	donors	in	Table	2.1.			At	the	same	time,	category	three	donors	do	have	some	programs	in	place	that	may	help	them	to	promote	their	own	development	policy	ideas.	Qatar,	for	example,	has	developed	a	strong	set	of	higher	education	institutions	that	attract	students	from	all	throughout	the	region.		While	many	of	these	schools	are	branches	of	western	universities,	they	attract	students	from	the	Middle	East	who	have	“self-selected”	into	a	culturally	similar	environment,	which	may	in	turn	reflect	a	desire	to	better	understand	Qatar’s	development	experience	and	its	ideas	about	development	policy	(Antwi-	Boateng	2013).	The	royal	family	in	Qatar	sponsors	many	of	these	higher	education	institutions,	and	Antwi-	Boateng	(2013:42)	has	suggested	that	these	international	students’	experiences	may	“make	them	much	more	tolerant	of	Qatari	foreign	policy,	if	not	susceptible”	(Anderson	2015).		Therefore,	it	is	at	least	plausible	that	Qatar’s	investment	in	the	higher	education	sector	may	reflect	a	state	strategy	to	achieve	a	“hearts	and	minds”	dividend	among	the	current	and	future	makers	and	shapers	of	development	policy	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries.																																																													11	Barakat	and	Zyck	(2010)	note	that	Qatar	has	only	recently	expanded	its	aid	activities	to	non-	Islamic	countries.	
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Similarly,	the	Singapore	Cooperation	Program	offers	training	courses	and	scholarships	for	mid	to	senior	level	officials	from	developing	countries	(Singapore	Cooperation	Program	2011).		The	Government	of	Singapore	sees	these	initiatives	as	important	way	to	exert	soft	power	and	“[build]	goodwill	and	warm	ties”	with	leaders	in	low	income	and	middle-income	countries	(Tay	Keong	2005;	Chia	Sheng-	Kai	2015).							It	is	also	important	to	recognize	an	additional	channel	through	which	“autocratic,	but	free-	market”	donors	might	exert	development	policy	influence:	through	pre-existing	affinities	that	counterpart	government	officials	have	for	the	development	policy	ideas	of	the	donor	country.		Kharas	(2015)	and	Shushan	and	Marcoux	(2011)	note	that	many	of	the	recipients	of	aid	from	UAE,	Qatar,	and	Kuwait	are	geographically	proximate	and	culturally	similar	countries.12	Therefore,	inasmuch	as	recipient	countries	and	their	foreign	sponsors	share	similar	governance	and	economic	orientations,	there	may	be	greater	scope	for	policy	transfer,	policy	emulation,	and	policy	learning	(Dolowitz	and	Marsh	2000;	Gilardi	2012).	Indeed,	these	particular	recipient	countries	may	have	selected	these	aid	donors	on	the	basis	of	their	pre-existing	affinities,	and	the	donors	may	have	selected	these	recipient	countries	because	they	expect	it	will	be	easier	to	have	influence	in	such	countries.	For	example,	North	Korean	entrepreneurs	hoping	to	open	their	country’s	economy	elect	to	participate	in	business	administration	courses	provided	by	Singaporean	NGO	the	Choson	Exchange	(Fifield	2015).		I	will	therefore	test	the	following	hypotheses:	
	
Hypotheses:			H5:		Autocratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	autocratic	governance	and	neoliberal	economic	policies.		H6:		Autocratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-income	and	middle	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	their	autocratic,	free	market	donor	countries.				
Autocratic,	State-	Led	Economies:			The	fourth	and	final	grouping	of	donor	countries	from	the	2x2	matrix	in	Table	2.1	consists	of	autocratic	states	with	state-led	economies.		These	countries’	unique	development	experiences	have	arguably	shaped	their	foreign	policy	and	international	development	policy	objectives	(Ramos	2004).				Specifically,	many	of	these	countries	have	managed	to	achieve	high	levels	of	economic	growth	and	major	development	gains,	while	at	the	same	time	governing	in	an	authoritarian																																																									12	For	example,	the	UAE’s	top	aid	recipients	include	Egypt,	Pakistan,	Afghanistan,	and	Jordan,	four	regional	countries	that	share	important	cultural	similarities	with	category	three	donors.			
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manner	and	granting	the	state	a	heavy	hand	in	the	management	of	the	economy	(Rodrik	2003;	Bremmer	2009).		A	growing	number	of	scholars	and	commentators	argue	that,	having	now	achieved	the	means	to	project	power	and	influence	overseas,	these	so-called	“rogue	donors”	are	actively	and	passively	exporting	a	unique	set	of	development	policy	ideas	that	challenge	the	democratic	and	free	market	principles	espoused	by	other	donors	(Romero	2007;	Naim	2007,	2012;	Halper	2010;	Sieff	2014).				Aid	from	this	cohort	of	donors	often	arrives	with	few	or	no	“strings	attached,”	and	provides	recipient	country	counterparts	significant	autonomy	and	discretion	to	use	funds	as	they	see	fit	(Dreher	et	al.	2015a)	New	research	also	suggests	this	focus	on	protecting	and	preserving	the	national	sovereignty	of	the	aid	recipient	can	insulate	public	sector	officials	from	external	pressure	for	democratic	and	market	reforms	and	thereby	embolden	leaders	in	the	developing	world	to	pursue	alternative	development	strategies	(Hernandez	2016).	Aid	from	authoritarian	governments	may	also	delay	or	reverse	democratization	processes	in	developing	countries	(Bermeo	2011;	Kersting	and	Kilby	2014).		Apart	from	the	direct	provision	of	aid,	critics	claim	that	that	this	cohort	of	illiberal	donors	has	developed	a	diverse	and	sophisticated	set	of	soft	power	tools	to	promote	the	virtues	of	authoritarianism	and	state-led	capitalism	(Schadlow	2013).		State-sponsored	TV	channels	--	such	as	Russia’s	RTV	and	Venezuela’s	Telesur,	which	operate	internationally	and	in	multiple	languages	--	represent	one	tool	to	broadcast	propaganda	far	beyond	one’s	borders	(Walker	2016).		Political	party	diplomacy	is	purportedly	another	tool	employed	by	illiberal	donors	to	exchange	and	promote	ideas	about	economic	management	and	governance.	China’s	Communist	Party,	for	example,	actively	cultivates	ties	with	political	parties	in	other	countries.	According	to	Aiping	(2015),	“more	than	81	African	political	parties	have	entered	formal	relations	with	[China’s	Communist	Party]”	thus	far,	and	the	ruling	parties	of	African	countries	frequently	dispatch	delegations	to	China	to	learn	more	about	its	economic	model	and	system	of	governance.		Aiping	(2015)	also	notes	that,	in	inter-party	discussions	about	governance,	China’s	Communist	Party	places	heavy	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	the	ruling	party	maintaining	internal	stability	to	promote	long-run	economic	growth	and	development.			Educational	and	professional	training	programs	are	additional	tools	that	can	be	used	to	diffuse	illiberal	beliefs.	Indeed,	illiberal	donor	countries	increasingly	provide	support	for	scholarship	programs	and	professional	training	programs	and	critics	charge	that	the	thinly	veiled	purpose	of	these	activities	is	to	advance	illiberalism	in	the	developing	world	(Sun	2015).	China,	for	example,	provides	thousands	of	scholarships	for	visiting	students	from	developing	countries	every	year,	and	this	program	seeks	to	not	only	“strengthen	the	understanding	and	friendship”	between	China	and	other	countries,	but	also	to	“[train]	future	leaders	...	who	might	serve	as	opinion	leaders	once	back	in	their	home	countries."	(Dong	and	Chapman	2008:	162).					Illiberal	donor	countries	can	also	transmit	their	development	policy	through	training	programs	that	specifically	target	existing	policymaking	elites	and	their	family	members	(LaFraniere	2009).	Beijing’s	Communist	Party,	for	example,	trains	developing	country	officials	on	how	to	more	efficiently	administer	state-owned	enterprises	(Tungendhat	
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2014).	It	also	sends	Chinese	government	officials	abroad	to	advise	developing	country	officials	on	the	design	and	implementation	of	agricultural	policies	and	programs	(Full	Text:	China’s	Foreign	Aid	2014).	Tungendhat	(2014)	estimates	that	63,000	policymakers	and	practitioners	from	Africa	participated	in	short-term	training	courses	sponsored	by	China	between	2003	and	2015.	China	also	offers	a	training	program	in	Beijing	for	visiting	diplomats	from	other	countries.	A	2005	New	York	Times	article	notes	that	“while	[this	effort]	seems	aimed	at	winning	African	hearts,	the	classes	in	diplomacy,	refined	over	the	past	decade,	seem	aimed	more	at	swaying	African	minds.”	(French	2005).			Illiberal	donors	have	also	ramped	up	their	support	for	think	tanks	abroad.	China,	for	example,	has	established	the	China-	Africa	Think	Tank	Forum,	which	seeks	to	unite	intellectual	elites	from	China	and	Africa	and	allow	them	to	exchange	ideas	and	opinions.	Chinese	President	Xi	Jinping	has	also	called	for	the	creation	of	a	new	set	of	government-controlled	think	tanks	to	increase	China’s	soft	power	(Xinhua	2014).		Independent	observers	note	that	Chinese	support	for	African	think	tanks	likely	reflects	an	effort	on	Beijing’s	part	to	influence	“opinion	leaders”	–	or	those	who	influence	policy	priorities	–	on	the	continent	(Sun	2015).13		Similarly,	the	Russian	state	has	extended	considerable	resources	to	its	favored	non-	governmental	organizations	(so-called	“GONGOs”	or	government-sponsored	non-governmental	organizations.)	in	neighboring	countries.		These	organizations	allegedly	promote	the	values	and	preferred	policies	of	their	state	sponsors	(Walker	2016).		There	is	some	anecdotal	evidence	that	suggests	developing	countries	value	the	alternative	model	of	development	being	promoted	by	illiberal	donors,	with	various	government	ministers	publicly	praising	it.		The	Deputy	Prime	Minister	of	Zimbabwe,	Arthur	Mutambara,	recently	told	the	Wall	Street	Journal:	“China’s	model	is	telling	us	you	can	be	successful	without	following	the	Western	example”	(Wonacott	2011).		In	Barbados,	the	Prime	Minister	justified	his	decision	to	keep	a	large	state	share	in	a	national	bank	by	drawing	upon	analogous	policy	decisions	taken	by	the	Chinese	and	Singaporean	governments	(Hardt	2009).				However,	the	literature	is	relatively	silent	on	the	question	of	under	what	conditions	illiberal	donors	will	have	more	or	less	policy	influence.	Given	that	“soft	power”	instruments	rely	on	“attractional”	forms	of	influence	rather	than	inducement,	coercion,	or	the	use	of	force,	I	predict	that	the	local	resonance	of	the	policy	ideas	promoted	by	illiberal	donors	will	be	a	major	determinant	of	where	such	ideas	are	influential.	This	homophily	principle	–	that	“birds	of	a	feather	flock	together”	--	suggests	the	following	set	of	predictions	about	the	circumstances	under	which	illiberal	donors	will	exert	policy	influence:																																																											13	There	is	some	anecdotal	evidence	that	China’s	charm	offensive	may	be	having	its	intended	effect.		Mulugeta	Gebrehiwot	Berhe,	the	director	of	a	think	tank	in	Ethiopia,	recently	noted	“African	governments	continue	to	appreciate	the	alternative	presented	by	China	in	an	increasingly	multipolar	world.		China	is	a	nation	that	knows	what	it	means	to	be	poor	and	it	is	considered	as	a	nation	that	has	developed,	and	perfected,	a	successful	wealth	creation	formula,	which	it	is	willing	to	share	with	developing	countries.	As	a	result,	China’s	importance	in	African	politics,	governance	and	development	is	growing”	(the	Second	Meeting	of	the	China-	Africa	Think	Tank	Forum	2012).	
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H7:	Autocratic	donors	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-	income	and	middle	income	countries	that	embrace	autocratic	governance	and	state-	led	economic	policies.		H8:	Autocratic	donors	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-	income	and	middle	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	autocratic	countries	with	state-led	economic	policies.																				
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Chapter	3	
	
		Social	scientists	have	proposed	a	large	number	of	testable	hypotheses	about	the	conditions	under	which	traditional	and	non-traditional	donors	will	influence	the	development	policy	priorities	of	public	sector	decision-makers	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	(Dunning	2004;	Finkel	et	al.	2007;	Kilby	2009;	Whitfield	2009;	Pop-Eleches	2009;	Gibson	et	al.	2015;	Girod	and	Tobin	2016).	Most	of	these	hypotheses	are	based	on	theories	of	bargaining	power:	the	idea	that	leverage	matters	and	both	donors	and	recipient	possess	different	types	and	sources	of	leverage.		In	Chapter	2,	I	proposed	an	alternative	explanation	that	is	based	on	the	notion	of	homophily.	Donors	will	exert	more	policy	influence,	I	have	suggested,	when	they	share	a	common	set	of	values,	policy	ideas,	and	objectives	with	their	developing	country	counterparts.	This	idea-based	explanation	of	policy	influence	differs	from	bargaining	power-based	explanations	in	fundamental	ways.	It	calls	attention	to	the	causal	role	that	ideas	might	play	in	shaping	policy	outcomes.	In	this	way,	it	is	consistent	with	–	and	builds	upon	–	social	constructivist	theory.		Chwieroth	(2009),	for	example,	has	previously	argued	that	policy	influence	is	a	function	of	the	donor’s	ability	to	“find	and	work	with	sympathetic	domestic	interlocutors	who	embrace	their	policy	goals.”	Kahler	(1992)	has	similarly	argued	that	“close	alignment	between	a	cadre	of	national	economic	technocrats	and	the	IFIs	seems	to	[be	a]	prerequisite	for	[reform]	agreement[s].”	Therefore,	among	those	who	believe	that	ideas	can	independently	shape	policy	outcomes,	a	key	hypothesis	is	that	a	shared	set	of	causal	beliefs	and	principled	beliefs	between	donor	agency	and	recipient	government	officials	will	increase	the	probability	that	a	donor	can	wield	policy	influence.					However,	none	of	these	hypotheses	are	testable	without	appropriate	data.	In	order	to	subject	these	hypotheses	to	empirical	testing,	one	needs	credible	and	comparable	information	about	the	development	policy	influence	of	multiple	donors	in	multiple	countries.			The	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey,	which	was	implemented	by	the	College	of	William	and	Mary	and	the	NORC	at	the	University	of	Chicago	during	the	summer	of	2014,	provides	a	solution	to	this	problem.	It	generated	data	on	the	development	policy	influence	of	more	than	100	Western	and	non-	Western	donors	in	126	in	low-	and	middle-	income	countries	(Custer	et	al.	2015).	It	did	this	by	posing	a	consistent	set	of	questions	about	the	agenda-setting	and	reform	design	influence	of	individual	donors	to	nearly	7,000	in-country	development	policymakers	and	practitioners.			
  
33 
33 
In	this	chapter,	I	will	leverage	this	novel	source	of	data	to	empirically	test	hypotheses	that	were	previously	untestable.	The	next	section	of	this	chapter	describes	how	I	operationalized	the	testing	of	the	hypotheses	presented	in	Chapter	2,	which	involved	categorizing	donors	and	recipients	according	to	their	form	of	governance	and	economic	policy	orientation	using	a	simple	2x2	matrix,	as	seen	in	Table	3.1.	I	will	then	report	on	and	interpret	the	findings	from	these	hypothesis	tests.					
Table 3.1: Model Matrix 	 Democracy	 Autocracy	
Free-	Market	Economy	
Category	1	(Democratic,	Free-Market	Economy)	
Category	3	(Autocratic,	Free-Market	Economy)	
State-	Led	Economy	 Category	2	(Democratic,	State-Led	Economy)	
Category	4	(Autocratic,	State-Led	Economy)		My	analysis	looks	at	a	subset	of	donors	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey.		All	multilateral	institutions	were	excluded	from	the	analysis,	as	all	of	my	hypotheses	relate	to	the	governance	and	economic	policy	traits	of	sovereign	states	and	it	would	be	difficult	and	contrived	to	categorize	or	otherwise	ascribe	these	traits	to	multilateral	institutions.		To	categorize	states	as	democracies	or	autocracies,	I	used	the	Polity	IV	dataset.		I	took	an	average	of	each	country’s	Polity	IV	value	over	the	10-year	period	covered	by	the	survey	(2004-2013).		The	index	assigns	countries	a	score	that	ranges	from	-10	to	10,	with	10	representing	a	full	democracy	and	-10	representing	a	full	autocracy.		I	considered	countries	with	values	of	6	or	higher	as	democracies	for	the	purposes	of	my	analysis.	This	approach	is	consistent	with	how	Polity	categorizes	countries	as	“Democracies”	and	“Full	Democracies.”		Countries	with	values	lower	than	six-	-	open	and	closed	anocracies	and	autocracies	--	were	considered	autocracies	in	my	analysis.14		I	then	used	the	Fraser	Institute	Economic	Freedom	of	the	World	Report	to	determine	whether	countries	were	considered	to	be	free-	market	or	state-	led	economies.		This	index	assigns	countries	a	score	from	0-10,	with	a	score	of	0	being	considered	a	lack	of	economic	
																																																								14	In	cases	where	Polity	data	for	a	donor	country	did	not	cover	the	10-year	period	of	the	survey,	I	took	the	average	of	all	available	years.			
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freedom	and	a	score	of	10	being	considered	complete	economic	freedom.		Again,	I	took	the	average	over	the	10-	year	period	covered	by	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey	(2004-2013)15.					Once	scores	were	compiled	for	all	donor	countries	included	in	my	analysis,	I	split	the	rank	ordered	distribution	of	countries	into	two	halves,	with	the	top	50%	of	donors	constituting	free-	market	economies,	and	the	bottom	50%	of	donors	being	categorized	as	state-	led	economies.			To	enrich	my	analysis,	I	also	leveraged	several	“write-	in”	donors	from	the	survey.		Question	12	in	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey	prompted	respondents	to:	“select	all	of	the	development	partners	(i.e.,	international	organizations,	foreign	embassies,	and	development	finance	agencies)	that	you	worked	directly	with	on	<<issue	domain	4>>	<<in.countryshort>>.	(Please	select	all	that	apply.)”		Respondents	then	had	the	option	to	write	in	donors	not	present	on	this	list.16		I	chose	to	include	in	my	analysis	only	those	countries	with	reasonably	well-established	established	aid	programs	–	specifically,	Singapore,	Chile,	Mauritius,	Estonia,	Slovakia,	Lithuania,	Israel,	Romania,	Slovenia,	Macedonia,	Mexico,	Croatia,	Thailand,	Indonesia,	Morocco,	Colombia,	Nigeria,	Ecuador,	Argentina,	and	Cuba.		I	then	categorized	these	donors	according	to	the	same	methodology	outlined	above.						Each	development	partner	included	in	the	original	survey	analysis	was	assigned	a	unique	Donor	ID.		These	write-in	donors,	however,	were	all	assigned	a	score	of	“1000,”	which	corresponded	to	a	residual	“other”	category.		To	leverage	the	selected	write-in	donors,	I	then	assigned	each	country	its	own	Donor	ID	and	hand	coded	the	STATA	dataset	to	reflect	these	updated	values.17	This	coding	procedure	resulted	in	the	following	2x2	matrix	(Table	3.2),	which	I	used	to	structure	my	analysis:			
 
 
 		
																																																								15	As	with	the	Polity	data,	in	cases	where	EFW	did	not	provide	scores	for	the	10-	year	period	covered	by	the	survey,	I	took	the	average	of	all	available	years.		This	affected	Qatar,	Taiwan,	Japan,	South	Korea,	India,	Libya,	and	Cuba.		16	Many	respondents	wrote	more	than	one	country.		I	excluded	these	respondents	from	the	write-	in	analysis,	as	the	set	up	of	the	survey	made	it	impossible	to	determine	which	donor	corresponded	to	the	influence	score	assigned	in	question	21.		17	Some	respondents	listed	write-	in	donors,	but	then	did	not	assign	them	a	score	for	their	agenda	setting	influence.		In	this	case,	I	did	not	assign	a	Donor	ID	because	the	write-	ins	could	not	further	my	analysis.			
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Table 3.2: Donor Matrix 	 Democracy		 Autocracy		
Free	Market	Economy		 Switzerland,	New	Zealand,	Canada,	Australia,	USA,	United	Kingdom,	Chile,	Ireland,	Finland,	Mauritius,	Estonia,	Denmark,	Austria,	Slovakia,	Taiwan,	Germany,	Luxembourg,	Norway,	the	Netherlands,	Japan,	Lithuania,	Spain,	Sweden,	South	Korea,	Belgium	
Singapore,	UAE,	Qatar,	Kuwait,		
State	Led	Economy		 France,	Israel,	Portugal,	Romania,	Bulgaria,	Poland,	Greece,	Slovenia,	Macedonia,	Mexico,	South	Africa,	Turkey,	Croatia,	Indonesia,	India,	Brazil,	Colombia,	Argentina		
Saudi	Arabia,	Thailand,	Russia,	Egypt,	Morocco,	China,	Nigeria,	Iran,	Libya,	Ecuador,	Venezuela,	Cuba	
		My	hypotheses	from	chapter	2	also	required	that	I	create	symmetrical	2x2	matrices	in	order	to	categorize	recipient	countries	by	governance	type	and	economic	orientation.		I	followed	the	same	principles	to	categorize	the	recipient	countries	from	the	2014	Reform	
Efforts	Survey.	I	used	the	Polity	IV	dataset	to	determine	whether	recipient	countries	were	democracies	or	autocracies,	with	6	again	being	the	cut	off	between	the	two	categories.		However,	a	considerable	amount	of	recipient	countries	were	not	included	in	the	Polity	dataset.		To	include	these	countries	in	the	2x2	matrix,	I	turned	to	the	Freedom	House	
Freedom	in	the	World	dataset.	This	dataset	assigns	countries	a	score	between	1-7,	with	1-	2.5	being	considered	“free”,	3-5	being	considered	“partly	free”,	and	5.5-7	being	considered	“not	free”.		I	took	the	average	of	these	scores	over	the	10-year	period	for	those	countries	not	included	in	the	Polity	IV	dataset.		Then,	I	ranked	the	countries	in	my	survey	sample	from	greatest	to	least	based	on	their	Polity	IV	scores	and	found	the	median	country.		This	country,	Burundi,	was	included	in	both	the	Polity	IV	and	the	Freedom	in	the	World	data	sets.		If	countries	without	a	Polity	IV	score	had	a	higher	average	score	than	Burundi	in	the	
Freedom	in	the	World	dataset,	I	considered	them	to	be	democracies.		If	they	had	a	lower	average	score,	I	considered	them	to	be	autocracies.			I	also	used	the	Fraser	Institute’s	Economic	Freedom	of	the	World	Report	to	categorize	countries	as	free-	market	or	state-	led	economies.		This	dataset	assigns	countries	a	score	from	0-10,	with	a	score	of	0	being	considered	a	lack	of	economic	freedom	and	a	score	of	10	being	considered	complete	economic	freedom.		Again,	I	took	the	average	over	the	10-	year	
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period	covered	by	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey	(2004-2013).18	As	with	the	Polity	IV	dataset,	not	all	recipient	countries	were	included	in	the	dataset.		Therefore,	I	used	a	supplementary	dataset,	the	Heritage	Foundation’s	Index	of	Economic	Freedom,	to	include	these	countries	in	the	2x2	categorization	scheme.		The	Index	of	Economic	Freedom	assigns	countries	a	score	from	0-100,	with	a	score	of	80-100	being	considered	“Free”	and	a	score	below	50	being	considered	“Oppressed”.		I	took	an	average	of	these	scores	to	find	the	absolute	level	of	performance	over	the	10-	year	period	covered	by	the	survey.	To	reconcile	the	differing	scales,	I	chose	a	country	with	a	Fraser	Institute	score	around	the	median	score	in	my	sample	that	was	included	in	both	datasets,	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina.		I	then	compared	countries	not	included	in	the	Fraser	Institute	dataset	to	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina’s	position	in	the	Heritage	Foundation’s	Index.		Countries	receiving	a	higher	score	were	considered	to	be	“Free	Market	Economies”	and	those	with	lower	scores	were	considered	to	be	“State-	Led	Economies.”19		This	led	to	the	creation	of	the	following	2x2	matrix	(Table	3.3)	for	recipient	countries:			
Table 3.3: Recipient Matrix #1, Absolute Level of Performance from 2004-2013 Absolute	level	of	performance			
Democracy	 Autocracy		
Free-	Market	Economy		 Georgia,	Peru,	El	Salvador,	Nicaragua,	Guatemala,	Jamaica,	Romania,	Honduras,	Albania,	Bulgaria,	Montenegro,	Zambia,	Kenya,	Botswana,	Philippines,	Belize,	Macedonia,	South	Africa,	Turkey,	Moldova,	Dominican	Republic,	Indonesia,	Cape	Verde,	Namibia,	Mongolia,	Kiribati,	Vanuatu,	Samoa,	Tonga,	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina,	
Jordan,	Armenia,	Uganda,	Cambodia,	Gambia,	Kazakhstan,	Fiji,	Bhutan,	Rwanda,	Papua	New	Guinea,	Suriname,	Kyrgyzstan,	Thailand,	Tunisia,	Haiti,	Tajikistan,	Comoros,	Sri	Lanka,	Solomon	Islands,	Swaziland		
																																																								18	As	with	the	Polity	data,	in	cases	where	EFW	did	not	provide	scores	for	the	10-	year	period	covered	by	the	survey,	I	took	the	average	of	all	available	years.				19	In	some	cases,	unrest	or	other	atypical	events	prevented	data	collection	for	certain	recipient	countries	over	the	10-	year	period.		If	countries	were	not	included	in	any	of	the	four	datasets	I	used,	they	were	excluded	from	the	analysis.		This	affected	Afghanistan,	Iraq,	Kosovo,	Marshall	Islands,	Palestine,	Somalia,	South	Sudan,	Sudan,	and	Tuvalu	
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Less	Free		 Paraguay,	Ghana,	Serbia,	India,	Brazil,	Bolivia,	Colombia,	Guyana,	Lesotho,	Timor-	Leste,	Mali,	Benin,	Senegal,	Sierra	Leone,	Ukraine,	Malawi,	Sao	Tome	and	Principe,	Federated	States	of	Micronesia	
Tanzania,	Egypt,	Morocco,	Yemen,	Vietnam,	China,	Madagascar,	Nigeria,	Azerbaijan,	Bangladesh,	Mauritania,	Iran,	Cameroon,	Pakistan,	Syria,	Ecuador,	Burkina	Faso,	Cote	d’Ivoire,	Togo,	Niger,	Mozambique,	Ethiopia,	Guinea,	Algeria,	Burundi,	Guinea	Bissau,	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo,	Central	African	Republic,	Chad,	Angola,	Myanmar,	Congo,	Zimbabwe,	Djibouti,	Belarus,	Cuba,	Liberia,	Laos,	Uzbekistan,	Eritrea,	Equatorial	Guinea,	North	Korea,	Turkmenistan,	Nepal,	Maldives			I	created	two	additional	2x2	matrices	to	determine	whether	states	were	becoming	more	or	less	democratic	and	more	or	less	economically	liberal	over	the	10-year	period	covered	by	the	survey.		This	led	to	the	creation	of	two	additional	2x2	matrices:	one	that	looks	at	the	absolute	change	in	performance	(on	the	same	measures)	over	the	10-year	period,	and	another	that	looks	at	the	percent	change	in	performance	(on	the	same	measures)	over	the	same	10-year	period.20		Once	these	scores	were	assigned,	I	ranked	the	countries	twice.		First,	I	ordinally	ranked	them	on	the	basis	of	the	absolute	change	in	either	Polity	IV	or	Freedom	House	score	over	the	10-year	survey	period.		The	top	50%	of	countries	were	considered	to	be	democracies	and	the	bottom	50%	were	considered	to	be	autocracies.		I	then	ordinally	ranked	the	countries	on	the	basis	of	the	absolute	change	in	either	their	Fraser	Institute	or	Heritage	Index	score	over	the	10-year	survey	period.		Again,	the	top	50%	of	countries	were	considered	to	be	free-	market	economies	and	the	bottom	50%	of	countries	were	considered	to	be	state-	led	economies.		This	resulted	in	the	following	categorization	(Table	3.4):			
Table 3.4: Recipient Matrix #2, Absolute Change in Performance between 2004-2013 Absolute	change	in	performance	(between	2004-	 Democracy	 Autocracy																																																									20	If	states	did	not	have	values	for	the	entire	10-year	period,	I	used	the	range	of	available	scores	to	calculate	both	the	absolute	change	and	the	percent	change.			
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2013)	
Free-	Market	Economy	 Pakistan,	Zimbabwe,	Myanmar,	Madagascar,	Comoros,	Liberia,	Guinea	Bissau,	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo,	Sierra	Leone,	Turkey,	Morocco,	Papua	New	Guinea,	Burundi,	Timor-	Leste,	Nicaragua,	Kenya,	Paraguay,	Laos,	Uzbekistan,	Mongolia,	Belarus,	Sao	Tome	et	Principe,	Rwanda,	Angola,	Dominican	Republic,	Macedonia,	Georgia,	Indonesia,	Montenegro,	Nigeria,	Tanzania,	Colombia,	Serbia,	Ukraine,	Cape	Verde,	Bulgaria,	Guyana	
Niger,	Tajikistan,	Cameroon,	Kazakhstan,	Vietnam,	Armenia,	Burkina	Faso,	Honduras,	Lesotho,	Philippines,	Tonga,	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina,	Jordan,	Senegal,	Ecuador,	Mozambique,	Bangladesh,	Mali,		
State-	Led	Economy	 Bhutan,	Nepal,	Tunisia,	Guinea,	Yemen,	Cote	d’Ivoire,	Mauritania,	Uganda,	Albania,	Egypt,	Zambia,	Djibouti,	Benin,	Central	African	Republic,	Moldova,	El	Salvador,	Turkmenistan,			
India,	Guatemala,	Kiribati,	Namibia,	Azerbaijan,	Cambodia,	Congo,	Malawi,	Algeria,	Botswana,	Brazil,	Haiti,	Romania,	Suriname,	Togo,	Peru,	Gambia,	Jamaica,	South	Africa,	Chad,	Ghana,	Belize,	Solomon	Islands,	Swaziland,	Micronesia,	Vanuatu,	Eritrea,	Samoa,	Cuba,	North	Korea,	Equatorial	Guinea,	Bolivia,	Iran,	Maldives,	Thailand,	Syria,	Sri	Lanka,	Ethiopia,	Fiji					I	followed	the	same	basic	procedure	to	create	a	third	2x2	matrix	on	the	basis	of	the	percent	changes	in	recipient	country	performance	over	the	10-	year	survey	period.		Again,	I	ranked	the	countries	from	greatest	to	least	based	on	the	percent	change	in	either	their	Polity	IV	or	Freedom	House	score.		The	top	50%	of	countries	were	considered	to	be	democracies	and	the	remaining	50%	were	considered	to	be	autocracies.		Then,	I	ranked	the	countries	based	on	the	percent	change	in	either	their	Fraser	Institute	or	Heritage	Index	score	over	the	10-	year	survey	period.		The	top	50%	of	countries	were	considered	to	be	free-	market	economies	and	the	remaining	50%	were	classified	as	state-	led	economies.		This	led	to	the	following	categorization	(Table	3.5):				 	
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Table 3.5: Recipient Matrix #3, Percent Change in Performance from 2004-2013 Percent	Change	in	Performance	(2004-2013)	 Democracy		 Autocracy	More	Free		 Guinea-	Bissau,	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo,	Madagascar,	Comoros,	Jordan,	Sierra	Leone,	Turkey,	Papua	New	Guinea,	Burundi,	Timor-	Leste,	Nicaragua,	Paraguay,	Kenya,	Angola,	Rwanda,	Dominican	Republic,	Laos,	Macedonia,	Nigeria,	Tanzania,	Colombia,	Ukraine,	Montenegro,	Indonesia,	Serbia,	Belarus,	Georgia,	Sao	Tome	and	Principe,	Cape	Verde,	Niger,	Mongolia,	Guyana,	Tajikistan,	Bulgaria,	Cameroon,	Vietnam,	China,	Kazakhstan,	Burkina	Faso,	Lesotho,	Philippines,	Honduras,	Armenia	
Senegal,	Ecuador,	Mozambique,	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina,	Mali,	Bangladesh,	Morocco,	Myanmar,	Zimbabwe,	Pakistan,	Ethiopia	
Less	Free		 Uganda,	Bhutan,	Liberia,	Djibouti,	Zambia,	Albania,	Syria,	Benin,	Iran,	El	Salvador,	Moldova	
Cote	d’Ivoire,	India,	Namibia,	Guatemala,	Congo,	Malawi,	Azerbaijan,	Cambodia,	Kiribati,	Algeria,	Botswana,	Brazil,	Haiti,	Romania,	Suriname,	Togo,	Peru,	Solomon	Islands,	Swaziland,	Gambia,	Micronesia,	Vanuatu,	Jamaica,	Samoa,	South	Africa,	Eritrea,	Ghana,	Belize,	Chad,	Cuba,	Equatorial	Guinea,	North	Korea,	Turkmenistan,	Tonga,	Bolivia,	Thailand,	Maldives,	Sri	Lanka,	Mauritania,	Egypt,	Central	African	Republic,	Fiji,	Nepal,	Yemen,	Tunisia,	Kyrgyzstan,	Guinea			
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After	creating	these	2x2	matrices,	I	created	dummy	variables	for	each	category	of	donor	and	recipient	states.21		My	hypotheses	vary	by	recipient	category;	that	is,	I	predict	that	different	types	of	donors	will	be	influential	in	different	types	of	recipient	countries.	The	hypotheses	from	Chapter	2	are	summarized	in	the	Table	3.6	provided	below.				
Table 3.6: Hypotheses Hypothesis	1	 Democratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	democratic	governance	and	neoliberal	economic	policies.		Hypothesis	2	 Democratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-income	and	middle-	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	democratic,	free	market	countries.		Hypothesis	3	 Democratic	donor	states	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	democratic	governance	and	state-	led	economic	policies.		Hypothesis	4	 Democratic	donor	states	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-income	and	middle-	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	democratic	donor	countries	with	state-	led	economies.		Hypothesis	5	 Autocratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	autocratic	governance	and	neoliberal	economic	policies.		Hypothesis	6	 Autocratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	who	were	educated	in	autocratic,	free	market	donor	countries.		Hypothesis	7	 Autocratic	donors	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-	income	and	middle	income	countries	that	embrace	autocratic	governance	and	state-	led	economic	policies.		Hypothesis	8	 Autocratic	donors	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-	income	and	middle-income	countries	who	were	educated	in	autocratic	countries																																																									21	There	were	three	sets	of	dummy	variables	for	recipient	states,	with	each	set	corresponding	to	one	of	the	three	2x2s	that	I	created.			
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embracing	state-	led	economic	principles.			I	then	used	t-tests	to	compare	the	average	influence	of	one	given	category	of	donors	compared	to	all	other	categories	as	perceived	by	one	given	donor	category.		To	gauge	the	relative	influence	of	various	donor	categories,	I	used	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	survey,	which	asked	respondents:			 “To	the	best	of	your	knowledge,	how	much	influence	did	each	of	the	following	development	partners	have	on	the	Government	<<of.countryshort>>’s	decision	to	pursue	reforms	focused	on	these	particular	<<issue	domain	16>>?	
(Please	use	the	slider	to	answer	on	a	scale	of	0	to	5,	where	0	means	no	influence	
at	all	and	5	means	a	maximum	influence.	You	can	use	any	number	between	0	
and	5.)22”			I	ran	these	tests	for	all	three	categorizations	of	recipient	states.		The	findings	were	virtually	identical	regardless	of	which	recipient	2x2	matrix	was	used,	so	the	main	results	that	I	will	report	here	are	based	on	the	absolute	level	of	democracy	and	economic	freedom	in	a	country	over	the	10-year	period	covered	by	the	survey.		For	a	more	detailed	summary	of	the	findings	from	the	additional	tests,	please	refer	to	Appendix	A.				Recall	that	hypothesis	1	predicted	that	democratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	democratic	governance	and	neoliberal	economic	policies.	I	took	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey	for	“category	1”	recipients	(those	from	democratic,	free-	market	states)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	1	donors	(again,	donors	associated	with	democratic,	free-	market	states),	comparing	this	average	to	that	of	category	1	recipients	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.23		I	found	that	category	1	respondents	appear	to	find	category	1	donors	to	be	more	influential	(2.446)	than	all	other	donor	categories	(1.747),	on	average	(Figure	3.1).		
																																																								22	Question	22	similarly	asks	respondents:	“To	the	best	of	your	knowledge,	how	much	influence	did	each	of	the	following	development	partners	have	on	the	design	of	the	Government	<<of.countryshort>>’s	<<issue	domain	18>>?	
(Please	use	the	slider	to	answer	on	a	scale	of	0	to	5,	where	0	means	no	influence	at	all	and	5	means	a	maximum	
influence.	You	can	use	any	number	between	0	and	5.)”.		I	only	used	question	21	because	the	answers	to	questions	21	and	22	were	virtually	identical.		For	more	information,	see	Figure	8	in	Parks,	Bradley,	Zachary	Rice,	and	Samantha	Custer.	2015.	Marketplace	of	Ideas	for	Policy	Change:	Who	do	Developing	World	Leaders	Listen	to	and	Why?	Williamsburg,	VA:	AidData	and	The	College	of	William	and	Mary.	http://www.aiddata.org/marketplace-of-ideas-for-policy-change	
23 Notes:	Agenda-setting	influence	is	on	a	scale	of	0-5,	where	0	means	“No	influence	at	all”	and	5	means	“Maximum	influence”.	Error	bars	indicate	standard	errors. 
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This	data	is	consistent	with	hypothesis	1.		The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.24				
			My	third	hypothesis	in	Chapter	2	was	that	democratic	donor	states	with	state-	led	economies	would	exert	more	policy	influence	in	low-	income	and	middle-	income	countries	that	embrace	democratic	governance	and	state-led	economic	policies.		To	test	this	hypothesis,	I	compared	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	
Survey	for	“category	2”	recipients	(those	from	democratic	recipient	states	embracing	state-	led	capitalism)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	2	donors	(those	associated	with	democratic	states	with	state-	led	economies),	to	those	of	category	2	recipients	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.		It	appears	that	category	2	respondents	appear	to	find	all	other	donors	to	be	more	influential	(2.1612)	than	category	2	donors	(1.773),	on	average	(Figure	3.2).		This	disconfirms	the	second	hypothesis	proposed	in	Chapter	2,	which	predicted	that	Category	2	recipients	would	find	Category	2	donors	to	be	more	influential	than	all	other	categories	of	donors.		The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.					
																																																								24	These	results	all	use	the	2x2	measuring	the	absolute	level	of	economic	freedom	and	regime	type	in	recipient	countries,	as	all	three	matrices	produced	extremely	similar	results.		For	the	results	from	the	other	two	matrices,	please	see	Appendix	A.		
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Figure	3.1:	Category	1	Respondents	Find	Category	1	Donors	
More	InHluential	
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			The	fifth	hypothesis	proposed	in	Chapter	2	predicted	that	autocratic,	free	market	donor	states	would	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	autocratic	governance	and	neoliberal	economic	policies.		To	test	this	hypothesis,	I	compared	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	
Efforts	Survey	for	“category	3”	recipients	(those	from	autocratic,	free-	market	states)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	3	donors	(again,	donors	associated	with	autocratic,	free-	market	states),	to	that	of	category	3	recipients	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.		I	found	that	Category	3	recipients	appear	to	find	all	other	donor	categories	(2.3067)	to	be	more	influential	than	category	3	donors	(1.0590),	on	average	(Figure	3.3).		This	disconfirms	the	hypothesis	predicted	in	Chapter	2,	which	expected	to	find	that	Category	3	recipients	would	find	Category	3	donors	to	be	more	influential,	on	average,	than	any	other	category.		The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.				
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Figure	3.2:	Category	2	Respondents	Hind	Category	2	Donors	Less	
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44 
44 
				The	seventh	hypothesis	proposed	in	Chapter	2	predicted	that	autocratic	donors	with	state-	led	economies	would	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-	income	and	middle	income	countries	that	embrace	autocratic	governance	and	state-	led	economic	policies.		To	test	this	hypothesis,	I	compared	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	
Efforts	Survey	for	“category	4”	recipients	(those	from	autocratic	states	with	state-	led	economies)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	4	donors	(again,	donors	associated	with	autocratic	states	with	state-	led	economies),	to	that	of	category	4	recipients	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.		The	results	disconfirmed	my	hypothesis,	with	category	4	respondents	appearing	to	find	all	other	donor	categories	to	be	more	influential	(2.1041)	than	category	4	donors	(1.4349),	on	average	(Figure	3.4).		The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.				
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			I	then	examined	each	respondent’s	country	of	education,	using	question	43_4	from	the	
2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey,	which	asks	respondents	to	identify	the	country	of	the	university	where	they	received	their	most	advanced	degree.25		I	used	this	information	to	create	a	new	variable	detailing	the	category	in	which	respondents	were	educated.		I	created	four	dummy	variables,	one	for	each	category	of	donor	states.		I	then	followed	the	same	procedure	outlined	above,	comparing	the	mean	perceived	influence	for	each	category	of	donors	to	all	other	categories	for	a	group	of	respondents	educated	in	a	given	category	of	donor	countries.26		Hypothesis	two	from	chapter	2	predicts	that	democratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-income	and	middle	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	democratic,	free	market	countries.	To	test	this	hypothesis,	I	compared	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	for	recipients	educated	in	democratic,	free-	market	(category	1)	states	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	1	donors	(donors	associated	with	democratic,	free-	market	states),	to	that	of	category	1	recipients	educated	in	category	1	states	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.		Recipients	educated	in	a	category	1	country	appear	to	find	category	1	donors	to	be	more	influential																																																									25	The	full	text	of	Question	43	reads:	“Please	identify	the	following	information	about	your	most	advanced	degree.”	Respondents	were	then	prompted	to	list:	“Name	of	Degree	(e.g.,	Bachelor	of	Arts	in	Economics),	Year	Degree	Earned,	Name	of	University,	Country	of	University”.			26	Notes:	Agenda-setting	influence	is	on	a	scale	of	0-5,	where	0	means	“No	influence	at	all”	and	5	means	“Maximum	influence”.	Error	bars	indicate	standard	errors.	
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(2.2209)	than	all	other	donor	categories	(1.3941),	on	average	(Figure	3.5).		This	confirms	hypothesis	two.			The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.				
			Hypothesis	four	from	chapter	2	predicts	that	democratic	donor	states	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-income	and	middle	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	democratic	donor	countries	with	state-	led	economies.		To	test	this	hypothesis,	I	compared	the	mean	responses	from	question	21	recipients	educated	in	democratic	states	with	state-	led	economies		(category	2)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	2	donors	(donors	associated	with	democratic	states	embracing	state-	led	economics)	to	that	of	category	2	recipients	educated	in	category	2	states	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.		The	results	disconfirmed	this	hypothesis,	with	recipients	educated	in	category	2	countries	finding	all	other	donor	categories	to	be	more	influential	(2.1179)	than	category	2	donors	(1.9509),	on	average	(Figure	3.6).	The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.					
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			Hypothesis	six	from	chapter	2	predicts	that	autocratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-income	and	middle	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	the	autocratic,	free	market	donor	countries.		However,	this	hypothesis	proved	to	be	impossible	to	test,	as	no	recipients	educated	in	category	3	(autocratic,	free-	market	states)	countries	answered	questions	about	category	3	donors.			Hypothesis	eight	from	chapter	2	predicts	that	autocratic	donors	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-	income	and	middle	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	autocratic	countries	with	state-	led	economies.		To	test	this	hypothesis,	I	compared	the	mean	responses	from	question	21	recipients	educated	in	autocratic	states	with	state-	led	economies		(category	4)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	4	donors	(autocratic	states	embracing	state-	led	economic	policies)	to	that	of	category	4	recipients	educated	in	category	4	states	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.		My	results	seem	to	disconfirm	this	hypothesis,	with	recipients	educated	in	category	4	countries	finding	all	other	donor	categories	(2.5308)	to	be	more	influential	than	category	4	donors	(1.6077),	on	average	(Figure	3.7).		The	finding	is	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.				
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Figure	3.6:	Category	2	Educated	Recipients	Find	Category	2	
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		On	the	whole,	the	results	from	these	hypothesis	tests	suggest	that	recipient	countries	generally	do	not	exhibit	a	preference	for	donors	who	share	their	regime	type	and	economic	policy	orientation.	However,	democratic,	free	market	recipients	are	an	important	exception;	they	have	a	clear	and	discernible	preference	for	democratic,	free	market	donors	and	are	more	likely	to	adjust	their	reform	priorities	in	response	to	the	advice	and	assistance	that	they	receive	from	such	donors.			A	very	similar	set	of	findings	emerge	when	one	categorizes	recipient	countries	according	to	their	pace	of	democratic	and	neoliberal	economic	reform	over	a	10-	year	period	(i.e.	the	second	and	third	2x2	matrices).		Neither	category	2	nor	category	3	nor	category	4	recipients	are	more	likely	to	be	influenced	by	donors	with	similar	governance	and	economic	policy	orientations.			However,	I	do	find	strong	support	for	hypotheses	1	and	2:	democratic	donors	with	free-	market	economies	generally	do	exert	more	policy	influence	on	countries	that	are	actively	attempting	democratic	and	neoliberal	economic	reform.	These	results	largely	corroborate	those	from	the	first	2x2	matrix.		For	a	more	robust	discussion	of	these	results,	please	refer	to	Appendix	A.				There	are	several	ways	to	interpret	these	findings.	One	possibility	is	that	traditional,	western	bilateral	donors	are	more	influential	than	non-traditional	donors	across	a	broad	swath	of	recipient	countries	(with	widely	varying	governance	and	economic	policy	orientations)	because	of	specific	attributes	that	they	possess	and	non-traditional	donors	lack.			Custer	et	al.	(2015),	for	example,	argue	that	the	varying	levels	of	“ground	game”	that	Western	and	non-Western	donors	have	in	recipient	countries	may	account	for	outsized	development	policy	influence	of	Western	donors	across	virtually	all	recipient	countries.			
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However,	it	is	also	possible	that	other	donor-level	attributes,	such	as	varying	levels	of	investment	and	attention	to	the	domestic	policy	matters	and	use	of	conditional	aid	contracts,	account	for	this	empirical	variation.		The	fact	that	democratic,	free	market	recipients	(and	recipient	country	officials)	prefer	to	work	with	democratic,	free	market	donors	provides	limited	and	conditional	evidence	for	my	homophily	argument.	Thus,	the	evidence	that	I	have	uncovered	suggests	that	my	theory	may	require	further	refinement	to	better	understand	why	the	homophily	principle	seems	to	hold	true	for	political	and	economically	liberal	donors	and	recipients,	but	not	other	combinations	of	donor	types	and	recipient	types.	One	potential	explanation	for	the	conditional	nature	of	the	evidence	I	have	uncovered	is	that	ideational	resonance	–	a	core	theoretical	concept	for	social	constructivists	–	instigates	changes	in	policy	behavior	(i.e.	has	causal	power)	in	some	but	not	all	empirical	settings.	If	this	is	true,	it	suggests	the	need	for	more	research	to	understand	the	conditions	under	which	ideational	resonance	matters.			It	is	also	important	to	note	that	there	is	an	existing	literature	on	why	democratic	countries	might	be	more	likely	to	undertake	externally-inspired	or	–influenced	reform	(Moravcsik	2000;	Pevehouse	2002a,	2002b;	Keefer	2007;	Kapstein	and	Converse	2008,	Mansfield	and	Pevehouse	2006).	The	conventional	argument	is	that	(young)	democracies	have	a	more	compelling	need	to	“lock	in”	reforms	--	by	making	external	commitments	to	donors	–	because	they	lack	domestic	political	credibility.	Mansfield	and	Pevehouse	(2006)	identify	three	reasons	why	(young)	democracies	lack	credibility.		Young	democracies	have	a	higher	risk	of	reform	reversal,	due	to	the	high	turnover	rate	in	leadership	and	the	differences	in	optimal	ex-	ante	and	ex-	post	policy.		Secondly,	regimes	may	begin	reforms	with	no	intention	of	seeing	these	reforms	to	completion.		Lack	of	information	about	regime	intentions	prevents	external	actors	from	evaluating	whether	a	regime’s	commitment	is	credible	or	not.		This	problem	is	amplified	in	new	democracies,	where	information	on	the	regime	in	power	is	even	more	limited.		Finally,	new	regimes	have	no	history	of	honoring	commitments,	and	regime	transitions	often	lead	to	institutional	changes.	Both	of	these	factors	limits	a	young	democracy’s	ability	to	send	credible	commitments	immediately	following	the	democratic	transition.						Yet	the	evidence	presented	in	this	chapter	suggests	that	this	theory	may	be	insufficient.		Specifically,	it	suggests	that	ideational	drivers,	such	as	the	values	and	beliefs	of	individual	decision-	makers	in	countries,	are	at	play.	Individual	policy	makers	educated	in	democratic,	free-	market	countries	seem	to	have	a	preference	for	democratic	and	economically	liberal	donors,	which	suggests	that	the	propensity	of	democratic	countries	to	undertake	externally-inspired	and	-influenced	reforms	may	be	related	to	ideational	transfer.		In	this	way,	my	study	also	contributes	to	an	emerging	literature	on	the	causal	influence	of	policymakers’	educational	and	professional	backgrounds	(Gohlmann	and	Vaubel	2007;	Parks	2014;	Mikosch	2011;	Farvaque	et	al.	2009;	Farvaque	et	al.	2011;	Gift	and	Krcmaric	2015).	Flores	et	al	(2013)	find	that	fledgling	democracies	with	leaders	educated	in	Western	institutions	receive	more	funding	from	the	IMF,	attributing	this	finding	to	the	higher	level	of	perceived	credibility	that	such	countries	purportedly	possess.		However,	my	findings	suggest	that	a	credibility	–	or	interest-	and	–incentive-based	–	explanation	cannot	fully	explain	the	tight-knit	relationships	that	exist	between	Western	donors	and	leaders	in	new	
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democracies.		The	micro-level	survey	data	that	I	have	analyzed	in	this	chapter	makes	it	possible	to	test	the	plausibility	of	the	notion	that	the	socialization	of	(future)	policymakers	to	a	common	set	of	development	policy	ideas	is	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	Western	donors	have	strong	relationships	with	(and	exert	more	policy	influence	on)	leaders	from	new	democracies.					It	should	also	be	noted	that	my	findings	cast	doubt	on	the	suggestions	of	Mansfield	and	Pevehouse	(2006):	that	(young)	democracies	undertake	reforms	and	join	international	organizations	to	increase	their	credibility	to	both	internal	and	external	actors	and	stabilize	their	own	democratic	transitions.	Indeed,	my	results	suggest	the	leaders	of	young	democracies	may	prefer	joining	and	working	with	international	organizations	for	reasons	that	have	nothing	to	do	with	their	interests	and	incentives.	To	determine	the	conditions	under	which	interest-,	incentive-,	and	idea-based	approaches	explain	variation	in	donor	influence,	significantly	more	research	will	be	necessary.																																												
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Chapter	4:				The	rapid	rise	of	non-	DAC	donors	in	the	international	market	for	aid	has	proven	to	be	a	major	source	of	consternation	among	Western	policymakers	and	pundits.		Moisés	Naím,	the	former	Editor-in-Chief	of	Foreign	Policy	magazine,	summarized	these	mounting	concerns	in	2009	when	he	wrote	that	“What	we	have	here	–	in	states	like	China,	Iran,	Saudi	Arabia,	and	Venezuela	–	are	regimes	that…collectively	represent	a	threat	to	healthy,	sustainable	development.	….	If	they	continue	to	succeed	in	pushing	their	alternative	development	model,	they	will	succeed	in	underwriting	a	world	that	is	more	corrupt,	chaotic,	and	authoritarian”	(Naím	2009).		Leaders	and	commentators	in	the	U.S.	and	in	Europe	continue	to	wring	their	hands,	worrying	that	China	and	other	non-Western	donors	will	disrupt	the	existing	international	order	and	dislodge	existing	international	norms	and	ideas	related	to	economic	and	political	liberalism	(Manning	2006;	Swaine	2011).		Scholars	have	also	sounded	the	alarm,	warning	that	the	economic	ascent	of	illiberal	regimes	may	lead	to	democratic	retreat	overseas	and	the	creation	of	a	new,	less	free	world	order	(Kurlantzick	2013;	Editorial	Board	2016;	Triffitt	2016).				My	findings	suggest	that	this	narrative	rests	on	a	weak	evidence	base.	The	notion	that	illiberal	donors	now	wield	outsized	influence	in	the	developing	world	is	something	of	a	“phantom	menace”;	Western	policymakers,	pundits,	and	scholars	ascribe	far	more	influence	to	non-Western	donors	than	they	actually	possess.			There	are	several	reasons	why	Western	policy	influence	predominates.	Established,	Western	donors	have	a	significantly	stronger	“ground	game”	than	newer	entrants	to	the	aid	market,	meaning	that	they	tend	to	have	significant	in-country	personnel	who	have	cultivated	strong	working	relationships	with	host	government	counterparts	(Custer	et	al.	2015).		The	small	footprint	that	non-Western	donors	have	in	their	counterpart	countries	may	reflect	staffing	and	financial	constraints	(Davies	2008),	or	an	interest	in	respecting	the	sovereignty	of	counterpart	countries	through	non-	interference	in	their	domestic	affairs	(Strange	et	al.	2013;	Dreher	and	Fuchs	2011).						Additionally,	traditional,	Western	donors	benefit	from	a	“backdoor”	of	influence,	as	they	employ	large	numbers	of	citizens	from	their	counterpart	countries	and	these	so-called	“local	hires”	often	go	on	to	work	for	the	host	government.	The	porous	boundary	between	aid	agency	employment	and	employment	in	counterpart	government	institutions	is	crucial	because	public	sector	officials	in	developing	countries	are	more	likely	to	view	a	donor	agency	favorably	if	they	have	previously	worked	for	that	donor	agency	(Custer	et	al.	2015).		
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Consequently,	Western	donors	–	who	have	invested	year	after	year	in	“local	hires”	for	more	than	a	half-century	–	have	gained	a	major	advantage	over	their	non-Western	counterparts.	Parks	(2015)	explains	that	“Western	aid	agencies	have	employed,	trained	and	professionally	socialized	a	disproportionately	large	number	of	future	policymakers	over	many	decades,	[so]	they	have	effectively	stacked	governments	across	the	developing	world	with	sympathetic	interlocutors	who	share	similar	policy	preferences.”	In	this	concluding	chapter,	I	will	discuss	several	potential	reasons	why	I	did	not	find	broadly	supportive	evidence	for	my	central	hypothesis.	Given	that	the	homophily	principal	is	not	a	powerful	driver	of	empirical	variation	in	donor	influence,	I	will	suggest	alternative	explanations	that	merit	further	inquiry.			One	possible	explanation	is	that	illiberal	donors	have	the	intent	to	influence	but	not	the	
capacity	needed	to	achieve	influence.	That	is	to	say,	it	is	possible	that	non-Western	donors	are	seeking	–	or	will	soon	seek	–	to	influence	the	development	policies	of	their	counterpart	countries,	but	they	simply	do	not	have	the	capacity	to	do	so.	The	analysis	that	I	have	undertaken	in	this	study	represents	a	“snapshot	in	time”	that	captures	the	influence	of	non-Western	donors	between	2004	and	2013.	It	is	not	yet	clear	whether	and	how	non-Western	donors	will	learn	and	adapt	and	adopt	new	strategies	and	policy	to	expand	their	influence	in	the	developing	world.		For	example,	if	non-Western	donors	take	a	page	out	of	the	playbooks	of	Western	donors	and	begin	to	establish	a	strong	“ground	game”	in	their	counterpart	countries,	we	may	very	well	see	a	change	in	the	distribution	of	policy	influence	across	liberal	and	illiberal	donors.	To	understand	whether	and	how	new	donors	expand	their	policy	influence,	regular	and	systematic	collection	of	data	on	the	influence	of	various	development	partners	will	be	crucial.			India,	a	country	with	a	long	history	of	giving	aid	despite	their	lack	of	an	official	aid	agency,	may	be	a	case	in	point.		India’s	aid	program	began	in	the	1950s,	despite	being	one	of	the	largest	recipients	of	aid,	giving	it	ample	time	to	develop	influential	practices	similar	to	those	of	tradition,	western	donors.				By	most	accounts,	India	desires	to	influence	the	domestic	development	policies	of	other	countries.		The	longstanding	Indian	Technical	and	Economic	Cooperation	(ITEC)	program,	one	of	the	bases	of	India’s	development	cooperation,	seeks	knowledge	transfer	both	through	sending	Indians	abroad	to	developing	countries	and	bringing	developing	country	officials	to	India	for	training	programs.	The	program	was	founded	on	the	logic	of	idea	sharing,	with	the	Ministry	of	External	Affairs	claiming	“it	was	necessary	to	establish	relations	of	mutual	concern	and	inter-dependence	based	not	only	on	commonly	held	ideals	
and	aspirations,	but	also	on	solid	economic	foundations”	(Ministry	of	External	Affairs	2016,	emphasis	added).		India	also	seeks	to	export	their	development	ideas	–	in	particular,	ideas	about	economic	policy	--		through	this	network	of	knowledge	transfer	(Beri	2003).				Despite	the	success	of	the	ITEC	program	and	India’s	record	of	significant	economic	growth,	the	country’s	development	assistance	program	still	does	not	conform	to	international	standards.	It	instead	consists	of	“a	mixed	bag	of	project	assistance,	purchase	subsidies,	lines	of	credit,	travel	costs,	and	technical	training	programs.”	(Agrawal	2007:5).		India’s	development	cooperation	has	no	central	governing	body,	and	is	currently	disbursed	
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through	multiple	sources	including	various	departments	within	the	Ministries	of	Finance	and	External	Affairs	as	well	as	the	Export-	Import	Bank	of	India.		This	diffuse	structure	has	led	analysts	and	Indian	policy	makers	alike	to	call	for	a	more	“coherent	structure”	and	“more	resources”	if	the	country	hopes	to	advance	its	objectives	(Agrawal	2007:	14)	(Mukherjee	2015).	These	characteristics	suggest	a	lack	of	capacity	rather	than	a	lack	of	intent	to	influence,	especially	in	light	of	the	movement	to	establish	an	official	aid	organization—the	India	International	Development	Cooperation	Agency	--	in	early	2007.27			Looking	to	the	future,	if	this	hypothesis	holds	true,	we	should	expect	to	observe	increases	in	Indian	(non-DAC)	development	policy	influence	as	Indian	(non-DAC)	capacity	expands.		However,	if	instead	we	witness	big	expansions	in	capacity	without	a	concomitant	increase	in	domestic	policy	influence,	this	would	suggest	weak	support	for	this	hypothesis	and	the	need	for	another	alternative	explanation.				A	second	possibility	is	that	illiberal	donors	do	not	have	the	intent	to	influence	in	the	same	
way	that	liberal	donors	do.		That	is	to	say,	it	is	possible	that	non-Western	donors	are	not	seeking	domestic	policy	influence,	but	rather	they	are	seeking	foreign	policy	influence.		Consider	China.	It	has	been	giving	aid	since	1950s,	despite	also	being	a	major	recipient.		It	has	had	ample	time	to	develop	“ground	game”	and	emulate	effective	Western	tactics	for	influencing	policymakers	in	recipient	countries.	However,	it	has	not	capitalized	on	these	opportunities.		While	India’s	disjointed	aid	structure	suggests	a	lack	of	capacity,	a	careful	examination	of	China’s	aid	suggests	a	more	fundamental	impediment	to	influence:	a	lack	of	intent.		New	research	suggests	that	China	does	use	its	aid	and	other	tools	of	economic	statecraft	to	buy	foreign	policy	support	and	to	advance	its	geostrategic	objectives.		Dreher	et	al	(2016)	find	that	Chinese	ODA	is	used	to	buy	or	reward	foreign	policy	support.		This	builds	upon	the	country’s	long	history	of	using	foreign	aid	to	achieve	its	foreign	policy	objectives.		Davies	(2007)	finds	that	early	Chinese	aid	supported	African	independence	movements,	later	leading	to	African	support	for	Chinese	initiatives	in	the	United	Nations.	In	1971,	China	used	aid	to	buy	support	from	African	countries	to	replace	Taiwan	on	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	(Davies	2007;	Kastner	forthcoming).		China	has	continued	to	reward	countries	that	respect	its	“One	China”	policy,	which	denies	Taiwan	recognition	as	an	independent	state	(Taylor	1998,	Brautigam	2009).		Even	as	China’s	aid	programs	have	grown	and	developed,	this	motivation	for	disbursing	aid	has	remained	consistent	according	to	various	analysts	(Davies	2007,	Brautigam	2009,	Kastner	forthcoming).						It	is	also	important	to	note	that	China	uses	other	tools	of	economic	statecraft	to	achieve	its	foreign	policy	objectives	–	in	particular,	regime	stability,	territorial	integrity,	and	continued	economic	development	(Kastner	forthcoming).		Kastner	(forthcoming)	finds	that	China	uses	bilateral	trade	linkages	to	support	its	search	for	recognition	as	a	market	economy	and	its	2005	Anti-	Secession	Law.		More	generally,	China’s	foreign	trade	is	seen	by	the	state	as	a	tool	to	garner	support	for	its	foreign	policy	objectives,	with	trading	partners	often																																																									27	Little	progress	has	been	made	in	the	years	following	this	announcement,	again	pointing	to	a	lack	of	resources	and	capacity	rather	than	a	lack	of	desire	to	influence	(Agrawal	2007).					
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exhibiting	foreign	policy	convergence	with	China	(Kastner	forthcoming;	Flores-	Macias	and	Kreps	2013;	Struver	forthcoming).		China’s	trading	partners	are	also	more	likely	to	support	Chinese	United	Nations	General	Assembly	(UNGA)	voting	patterns,	which	suggests	that	the	country’s	trade	patterns	allow	it	to	advance	its	foreign	policy	goals.	(Struver	forthcoming).					It	is	also	worth	noting	that	China	has	recently	taken	a	lead	role	in	establishing	two	new	development	banks:	the	New	Development	Bank	(NDB)	and	the	Asian	Infrastructure	Investment	Bank	(AIIB).		These	fledgling	institutions	demonstrate	that	China	has	the	capacity	to	undertake	large	development	projects	and	to	create	institutions	with	enough	heft	to	influence	the	domestic	policies	of	developing	countries.		This	has	fueled	speculation	among	pundits	and	policymakers	who	suggest	that	China	might	use	its	disproportionate	voting	share	in	the	AIIB	to	steer	countries	towards	“Beijing	Consensus”	types	of	policies	(Lazarus	2016;	Perlez	2015;	Nabili	2016).		However,	in	spite	of	these	concerns	and	the	significant	capacity	of	the	NDB	and	AIIB,	China	and	other	illiberal	donors	have	not	yet	made	inroads	into	the	domestic	policy	arenas	of	the	countries	that	they	assist.		This	suggests	that	domestic	policy	influence	may	not	be	a	major	goal	of	the	illiberal	donors.									If	this	latter	hypothesis	proves	to	be	true,	it	will	mean	that	Western	policymakers	and	pundits	have	not	only	seriously	misjudged	the	intentions	of	emerging	powers	but	also	the	threats	that	they	pose	to	democracy	and	the	liberal	world	order.		Illiberal	donors	may	in	fact	be	seeking	to	advance	their	own	foreign	policy	goals	rather	than	exporting	their	governance	models	and	economic	ideologies,	effectively	allowing	Western	donors	to	compete	amongst	themselves	for	the	hearts	and	minds	of	leaders	in	developing	countries.		Addressing	this	question	in	a	more	thorough	and	convincing	way	should	arguably	be	a	priority	for	future	research	on	the	causes	and	consequences	of	donor	policy	influence.																							
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Appendix	A:			In	this	appendix,	I	detail	the	statistical	tests	from	the	second	and	third	recipient	2x2s	that	were	not	included	in	chapter	3.		These	results	were	virtually	identical	to	those	from	the	first	2x2,	finding	that	only	democratic,	free-	market	recipients	find	aid	from	their	“homophily	category”,	in	this	case,	democratic-	free-	market	recipients,	to	be	more	influential	than	other	categories.				Recall	that	I	created	two	additional	2x2	matrices	to	determine	whether	states	were	becoming	more	or	less	democratic	and	more	or	less	economically	liberal	over	the	10-year	period	covered	by	the	survey.		This	led	to	the	creation	of	two	additional	2x2	matrices:	one	that	looks	at	the	absolute	change	in	performance	(on	the	same	measures)	over	the	10-year	period,	and	another	that	looks	at	the	percent	change	in	performance		(on	the	same	measures)	over	the	same	10-year	period.28		Once	these	scores	were	assigned,	I	ranked	the	countries	twice.		First,	I	ordinally	ranked	them	on	the	basis	of	the	absolute	change	in	either	Polity	IV	or	Freedom	house	score	over	the	10-year	survey	period.		The	top	50%	of	countries	were	considered	to	be	democracies	and	the	bottom	50%	were	considered	to	be	autocracies.		I	then	ordinally	ranked	the	countries	on	the	basis	of	the	absolute	change	in	either	their	Fraser	Institute	or	Heritage	Index	score	over	the	10-year	survey	period.		Again,	the	top	50%	of	countries	were	considered	to	be	free-	market	economies	and	the	bottom	50%	of	countries	were	considered	to	be	state-	led	economies.		This	resulted	in	the	following	categorization:		
Table A1: Recipient 2x2 Matrix #2, Absolute Change in Performance between 2004-2013 Absolute	change	in	performance	(between	2004-	2013)	
Democracy	 Autocracy	
Free-	Market	Economy	 Pakistan,	Zimbabwe,	Myanmar,	Madagascar,	Comoros,	Liberia,	Guinea	Bissau,	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo,	Sierra	Leone,	Turkey,	Morocco,	Papua	New	Guinea,	Burundi,	Timor-	Leste,	Nicaragua,	Kenya,	Paraguay,	Laos,	Uzbekistan,	Mongolia,	Belarus,	Sao	Tome	et	
Niger,	Tajikistan,	Cameroon,	Kazakhstan,	Vietnam,	Armenia,	Burkina	Faso,	Honduras,	Lesotho,	Philippines,	Tonga,	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina,	Jordan,	Senegal,	Ecuador,	Mozambique,	Bangladesh,	Mali,		
																																																								28	If	states	did	not	have	values	for	the	entire	10-year	period,	I	used	the	range	of	available	scores	to	calculate	both	the	absolute	change	and	the	percent	change.			
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Principe,	Rwanda,	Angola,	Dominican	Republic,	Macedonia,	Georgia,	Indonesia,	Montenegro,	Nigeria,	Tanzania,	Colombia,	Serbia,	Ukraine,	Cape	Verde,	Bulgaria,	Guyana	State-	Led	Economy	 Bhutan,	Nepal,	Tunisia,	Guinea,	Yemen,	Cote	d’Ivoire,	Mauritania,	Uganda,	Albania,	Egypt,	Zambia,	Djibouti,	Benin,	Central	African	Republic,	Moldova,	El	Salvador,	Turkmenistan,			
India,	Guatemala,	Kiribati,	Namibia,	Azerbaijan,	Cambodia,	Congo,	Malawi,	Algeria,	Botswana,	Brazil,	Haiti,	Romania,	Suriname,	Togo,	Peru,	Gambia,	Jamaica,	South	Africa,	Chad,	Ghana,	Belize,	Solomon	Islands,	Swaziland,	Micronesia,	Vanuatu,	Eritrea,	Samoa,	Cuba,	North	Korea,	Equatorial	Guinea,	Bolivia,	Iran,	Maldives,	Thailand,	Syria,	Sri	Lanka,	Ethiopia,	Fiji		I	followed	the	same	basic	procedure	to	create	a	third	2x2	matrix	on	the	basis	of	the	percent	changes	in	recipient	country	performance	over	the	10-	year	survey	period.		Again,	I	ranked	the	countries	from	greatest	to	least	based	on	the	percent	change	in	either	their	Polity	IV	or	Freedom	House	score.		The	top	50%	of	countries	were	considered	to	be	democracies	and	the	remaining	50%	were	considered	to	be	autocracies.		Then,	I	ranked	the	countries	based	on	the	percent	change	in	either	their	Fraser	Institute	or	Heritage	Index	score	over	the	10-	year	survey	period.		The	top	50%	of	countries	were	considered	to	be	free-	market	economies	and	the	remaining	50%	were	classified	as	state-	led	economies.		This	led	to	the	following	categorization:				
Table A2: Recipient 2x2 #3, Percent Change in Performance between 2004-2013 Percent	Change	in	Performance	(2004-2013)	 Democracy		 Autocracy	More	Free		 Guinea-	Bissau,	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo,	Madagascar,	Comoros,	Jordan,	Sierra	Leone,	Turkey,	Papua	New	Guinea,	Burundi,	Timor-	Leste,	Nicaragua,	Paraguay,	Kenya,	Angola,	Rwanda,	Dominican	Republic,	Laos,	Macedonia,	Nigeria,	Tanzania,	Colombia,	
Senegal,	Ecuador,	Mozambique,	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina,	Mali,	Bangladesh,	Morocco,	Myanmar,	Zimbabwe,	Pakistan,	Ethiopia	
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Ukraine,	Montenegro,	Indonesia,	Serbia,	Belarus,	Georgia,	Sao	Tome	and	Principe,	Cape	Verde,	Niger,	Mongolia,	Guyana,	Tajikistan,	Bulgaria,	Cameroon,	Vietnam,	China,	Kazakhstan,	Burkina	Faso,	Lesotho,	Philippines,	Honduras,	Armenia	Less	Free		 Uganda,	Bhutan,	Liberia,	Djibouti,	Zambia,	Albania,	Syria,	Benin,	Iran,	El	Salvador,	Moldova	
Cote	d’Ivoire,	India,	Namibia,	Guatemala,	Congo,	Malawi,	Azerbaijan,	Cambodia,	Kiribati,	Algeria,	Botswana,	Brazil,	Haiti,	Romania,	Suriname,	Togo,	Peru,	Solomon	Islands,	Swaziland,	Gambia,	Micronesia,	Vanuatu,	Jamaica,	Samoa,	South	Africa,	Eritrea,	Ghana,	Belize,	Chad,	Cuba,	Equatorial	Guinea,	North	Korea,	Turkmenistan,	Tonga,	Bolivia,	Thailand,	Maldives,	Sri	Lanka,	Mauritania,	Egypt,	Central	African	Republic,	Fiji,	Nepal,	Yemen,	Tunisia,	Kyrgyzstan,	Guinea		After	creating	these	2x2	matrices,	I	created	dummy	variables	for	each	category	of	donor	and	recipient	states.29		My	hypotheses	vary	by	recipient	category;	that	is,	I	predict	that	different	types	of	donors	will	be	influential	in	different	types	of	recipient	countries.	The	hypotheses	from	Chapter	2	are	summarized	in	the	Table	provided	below.			
Table A3: Hypotheses Hypothesis	1	 Democratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	democratic	governance	and	neoliberal	economic	policies.		Hypothesis	2	 Democratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-income	and	middle	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	democratic,	free	market	countries.		Hypothesis	3	 Democratic	donor	states	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	democratic	governance	and	state-	led																																																									29	There	were	three	sets	of	dummy	variables	for	recipient	states,	with	each	set	corresponding	to	one	of	the	three	2x2s	that	I	created.			
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economic	policies.		Hypothesis	4	 Democratic	donor	states	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-income	and	middle	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	democratic	donor	countries	with	state-	led	economies.		Hypothesis	5	 Autocratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	autocratic	governance	and	neoliberal	economic	policies.		Hypothesis	6	 Autocratic,	free	market	donor	states	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-income	and	middle	income	countries	who	were	educated	in	autocratic,	free	market	donor	countries.		Hypothesis	7	 Autocratic	donors	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-	income	and	middle	income	countries	that	embrace	autocratic	governance	and	state-	led	economic	policies.		Hypothesis	8	 Autocratic	donors	with	state-	led	economies	will	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	among	individuals	in	low-	income	and	middle-income	countries	who	were	educated	in	autocratic	countries	with	state-	led	economies.			I	then	used	t-tests	to	compare	the	average	influence	of	one	given	category	of	donors	compared	to	all	other	categories	as	perceived	by	one	given	donor	category.		To	gauge	the	relative	influence	of	various	donor	categories,	I	used	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	survey,	which	asked	respondents:			 “To	the	best	of	your	knowledge,	how	much	influence	did	each	of	the	following	development	partners	have	on	the	Government	<<of.countryshort>>’s	decision	to	pursue	reforms	focused	on	these	particular	<<issue	domain	16>>?	
(Please	use	the	slider	to	answer	on	a	scale	of	0	to	5,	where	0	means	no	influence	
at	all	and	5	means	a	maximum	influence.	You	can	use	any	number	between	0	
and	5.)30”																																																										30	Question	22	similarly	asks	respondents:	“To	the	best	of	your	knowledge,	how	much	influence	did	each	of	the	following	development	partners	have	on	the	design	of	the	Government	<<of.countryshort>>’s	<<issue	domain	18>>?	
(Please	use	the	slider	to	answer	on	a	scale	of	0	to	5,	where	0	means	no	influence	at	all	and	5	means	a	maximum	
influence.	You	can	use	any	number	between	0	and	5.)”.		I	only	used	question	21	because	the	answers	to	questions	21	and	22	were	virtually	identical.		For	more	information,	see	Figure	8	in	Parks,	Bradley,	Zachary	
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	First,	I	will	report	the	findings	from	the	second	2x2,	which	measures	the	absolute	change	in	a	country’	economic	and	political	performance	between	2004-	2013.				Recall	that	hypothesis	1	predicted	that	democratic,	free	market	donor	states	would	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	democratic	governance	and	neoliberal	economic	policies.	I	took	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey	for	“category	1”	recipients	(those	from	democratic,	free-	market	states)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	1	donors	(again,	donors	associated	with	democratic,	free-	market	states),	comparing	this	average	to	category	1	recipients	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.31		I	found	that	category	1	respondents	appear	to	find	category	1	donors	to	be	more	influential	(2.485)	than	all	other	donor	categories	(1.879),	on	average	(Figure	A1).		This	confirms	hypothesis	1.		The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.		
																																																																																																																																																																																					Rice,	and	Samantha	Custer.	2015.	Marketplace	of	Ideas	for	Policy	Change:	Who	do	Developing	World	Leaders	Listen	to	and	Why?	Williamsburg,	VA:	AidData	and	The	College	of	William	and	Mary.	http://www.aiddata.org/marketplace-of-ideas-for-policy-change	
31 Notes:	Agenda-setting	influence	is	on	a	scale	of	0-5,	where	0	means	“No	influence	at	all”	and	5	means	“Maximum	influence”.	Error	bars	indicate	standard	errors. 
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My	third	hypothesis	in	Chapter	2	was	that	democratic	donor	states	with	state-	led	economies	would	exert	more	policy	influence	in	low-	income	and	middle-	income	countries	that	embrace	democratic	governance	and	state-led	economic	policies.		To	test	this	hypothesis	I	compared	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	
Survey	for	“category	2”	recipients	(those	from	democratic	recipient	states	embracing	state-	led	capitalism)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	2	donors	(those	associated	with	democratic	states	with	state-	led	economies),	to	that	of	category	2	recipients	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.		It	appears	that	category	2	respondents	appear	to	find	all	other	donors	to	be	more	influential	(2.412)	than	category	2	donors	(1.498),	on	average	(Figure	A2).		This	disconfirms	the	second	hypothesis	proposed	in	Chapter	2,	which	predicted	that	Category	2	recipients	would	find	Category	2	donors	to	be	more	influential	than	all	other	categories	of	donors.		The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.				
		The	fifth	hypothesis	proposed	in	Chapter	2	predicted	that	autocratic,	free	market	donor	states	would	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	autocratic	governance	and	neoliberal	economic	policies.		To	test	this	hypothesis,	I	compared	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	
Efforts	Survey	for	“category	3”	recipients	(those	from	autocratic,	free-	market	states)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	3	donors	(again,	donors	associated	with	autocratic,	free-	market	states),	to	that	of	category	3	recipients	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.		I	found	that	Category	3	recipients	appear	to	find	all	other	donor	categories	(1.954)	to	be	more	influential	than	category	3	donors	(0.0734),	on	average	(Figure	A3).		This	disconfirms	the	hypothesis	predicted	in	Chapter	2,	which	expected	to	find	the	opposite	result,	with	Category	3	recipients	finding	Category	3	donors	to	be	more	influential,	on	average,	than	any	other	category.		The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.			
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		The	seventh	hypothesis	proposed	in	Chapter	2	predicted	that	autocratic	donors	with	state-	led	economies	would	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-	income	and	middle	income	countries	that	embrace	autocratic	governance	and	state-	led	economic	policies.		To	test	this	hypothesis,	I	compared	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	
Efforts	Survey	for	“category	4”	recipients	(those	from	autocratic	states	with	state-	led	economies)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	4	donors	(again,	donors	associated	with	autocratic	states	with	state-	led	economies),	to	that	of	category	4	recipients	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.		The	results	disconfirmed	my	hypothesis,	with	category	4	respondents	appearing	to	find	all	other	donor	categories	to	be	more	influential	(2.128)	than	category	4	donors	(1.451),	on	average	(Figure	A4).		The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.				
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		I	then	ran	the	same	test	for	the	third	2x2,	which	measured	the	percent	change	in	a	country’s	economic	and	political	performance	between	2004	and	2013.		The	results	are	as	follows:			Recall	that	hypothesis	1	predicted	that	democratic,	free	market	donor	states	would	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	democratic	governance	and	neoliberal	economic	policies.	I	took	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	Survey	for	“category	1”	recipients	(those	from	democratic,	free-	market	states)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	1	donors	(again,	donors	associated	with	democratic,	free-	market	states),	comparing	this	average	to	category	1	recipients	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.32		I	found	that	category	1	respondents	appear	to	find	category	1	donors	to	be	more	influential	(2.496)	than	all	other	donor	categories	(1.552),	on	average	(Figure	A5).		This	confirms	hypothesis	1.		The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.		
																																																								
32 Notes:	Agenda-setting	influence	is	on	a	scale	of	0-5,	where	0	means	“No	influence	at	all”	and	5	means	“Maximum	influence”.	Error	bars	indicate	standard	errors. 
1.451	
2.128	
0	 0.5	 1	 1.5	 2	 2.5	 3	
Category	4	Donors	
All	Other	Donor	Categories		
Agenda	Setting	InHluence	(0-5)	
Figure	A4:	Category	4	Respondents	Find	Category	4	
Donors	Less	InHluential	
  
63 
63 
			My	third	hypothesis	in	Chapter	2	was	that	democratic	donor	states	with	state-	led	economies	would	exert	more	policy	influence	in	low-	income	and	middle-	income	countries	that	embrace	democratic	governance	and	state-led	economic	policies.		To	test	this	hypothesis	I	compared	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	Efforts	
Survey	for	“category	2”	recipients	(those	from	democratic	recipient	states	embracing	state-	led	capitalism)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	2	donors	(those	associated	with	democratic	states	with	state-	led	economies),	to	that	of	category	2	recipients	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.		It	appears	that	category	2	respondents	appear	to	find	all	other	donors	to	be	more	influential	(2.243)	than	category	2	donors	(1.895),	on	average	(Figure	A6).		This	disconfirms	the	second	hypothesis	proposed	in	Chapter	2,	which	predicted	that	Category	2	recipients	would	find	Category	2	donors	to	be	more	influential	than	all	other	categories	of	donors.		The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.				
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		The	fifth	hypothesis	proposed	in	Chapter	2	predicted	that	autocratic,	free	market	donor	states	would	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-income	and	middle-income	countries	that	embrace	autocratic	governance	and	neoliberal	economic	policies.		To	test	this	hypothesis,	I	compared	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	
Efforts	Survey	for	“category	3”	recipients	(those	from	autocratic,	free-	market	states)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	3	donors	(again,	donors	associated	with	autocratic,	free-	market	states),	to	that	of	category	3	recipients	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.		I	found	that	Category	3	recipients	appear	to	find	all	other	donor	categories	(2.157)	to	be	more	influential	than	category	3	donors	(1.367),	on	average	(Figure	A7).		This	disconfirms	the	hypothesis	predicted	in	Chapter	2,	which	expected	to	find	the	opposite	result,	with	Category	3	recipients	finding	Category	3	donors	to	be	more	influential,	on	average,	than	any	other	category.		The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.				
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		The	seventh	hypothesis	proposed	in	Chapter	2	predicted	that	autocratic	donors	with	state-	led	economies	would	be	considered	to	be	more	influential	in	low-	income	and	middle	income	countries	that	embrace	autocratic	governance	and	state-	led	economic	policies.		To	test	this	hypothesis,	I	compared	the	mean	responses	to	question	21	from	the	2014	Reform	
Efforts	Survey	for	“category	4”	recipients	(those	from	autocratic	states	with	state-	led	economies)	who	had	scored	the	relative	influence	of	category	4	donors	(again,	donors	associated	with	autocratic	states	with	state-	led	economies),	comparing	to	that	of	category	4	recipients	who	scored	the	remaining	three	categories.		The	results	disconfirmed	my	hypothesis,	with	category	4	respondents	appearing	to	find	all	other	donor	categories	to	be	more	influential	(2.184)	than	category	4	donors	(1.560),	on	average	(Figure	A8).		The	finding	was	statistically	significant,	with	a	p	value	of	0.				
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		As	with	the	results	presented	in	chapter	3,	the	results	from	these	hypothesis	tests	suggest	that	recipient	countries	generally	do	not	exhibit	a	preference	for	donors	who	share	their	regime	type	and	economic	policy	orientation.	However,	democratic,	free	market	recipients	are	an	important	exception;	they	have	a	clear	and	discernible	preference	for	democratic,	free	market	donors	and	are	more	likely	to	adjust	their	reform	priorities	in	response	to	the	advice	and	assistance	that	they	receive	from	such	donors.		For	a	more	robust	discussion	of	these	results,	please	see	Chapter	3.					
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